CN1650603A - System and method for acoustic two factor authentication - Google Patents

System and method for acoustic two factor authentication Download PDF

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Publication number
CN1650603A
CN1650603A CNA038070316A CN03807031A CN1650603A CN 1650603 A CN1650603 A CN 1650603A CN A038070316 A CNA038070316 A CN A038070316A CN 03807031 A CN03807031 A CN 03807031A CN 1650603 A CN1650603 A CN 1650603A
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CN
China
Prior art keywords
signature
signal
pin
receiver
computer
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
CNA038070316A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
A·甘特曼
G·G·罗斯
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Qualcomm Inc
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Qualcomm Inc
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Publication date
Priority claimed from US10/077,365 external-priority patent/US7251730B2/en
Application filed by Qualcomm Inc filed Critical Qualcomm Inc
Publication of CN1650603A publication Critical patent/CN1650603A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
    • G06Q20/3272—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices using an audio code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/346—Cards serving only as information carrier of service
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
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    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
    • G06Q20/3672—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes initialising or reloading thereof
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    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
    • G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3821—Electronic credentials
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/082—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying multi-factor authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/65—Environment-dependent, e.g. using captured environmental data

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  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Digital Transmission Methods That Use Modulated Carrier Waves (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

A hand-held token can be operated to generate an acoustic or other wireless signal representing a digital signature produced from the private key of a public key pair (44), with the public key being confidential in that it is known only to authorized entities, such as bank computers. The signal from the token can be received by, e.g., a receiver at a bank ATM (46) that also requires a PIN for account access. The user enters the PIN into the ATM (48), and the ATM (52) encrypts the signal from the token with the PIN and sends it on to the bank computer (54) over a link that need not be secure, since even if the PIN is guessed there is no way to verify that it is the correct PIN without also knowing the confidential public key held by the bank computer.

Description

The system and method for acoustic two factor authentication
Relevant application
The application is the U.S. Patent application of submitting on February 15th, 2002 the 10/077th, No. 365 denominations of invention are the continuation application of " Method and Apparatus for Simplified Audio Authentication (method and apparatus of the audio authentication of simplification) " this patent application of awaiting the reply jointly, and this patent application is incorporated into this by reference.
I. invention field
The present invention relates generally to use the authentication of audio tones.
II. background of invention
Along with the growth that the internet uses, the convenient type ecommerce of many types has become possibility, is connected to ATM (ATM) of remote bank or the like such as on-line purchase commodity and service, online bank and use.But the convenience of ecommerce also makes the burglar steal valuable information and/or disguises oneself as and do not want to buy commodity and do not want to be more prone to from the people of bank account drawing or the like just.
Therefore, in electronic transaction, provide safety most important.For this reason, the encrypted personal information that is exchanged of hiding of many electronic transactions.But encrypt a just aspect of safety, because the burglar may crack encryption method or and then hold the transaction of encrypting such as the effective article of this class of credit card, the owner and participating in of disguising oneself as.
Notice this point, just understanding authentication easily is a safe importance.At electronic commerce context, the individual of authentication attempt finishes by computer interface.Therefore, if the infrastructure of bio-sensing type computer annex generally is not installed, take to check individual biological property to verify that this people is that he claims that the people that he is is not practical usually so.
This can use two authentication key elements, that is, and and based on people of item authentication such as credit card or key chain that the individual had, or based on people of the authentication of the things such as password or PIN(Personal Identification Number) known to the individual.To some responsive especially application such as ATM withdrawal, perhaps two kinds of key elements all need.
At present, ATM user inserts ATM to the authenticating device such as credit card, imports PIN then.This method has been finished two factor authentication.But ATM must send to secret information on the card and PIN both Central Bank's computer and authenticates.Therefore, the link between bank and the ATM must safety, with prevent the burglar eavesdrop on the line and find to authenticate key element both, described authentication key element makes the burglar steal money from user account.This brings great burden for the link basis facility.
The patent application of pointing out has above disclosed hand-held " token " based on sound wave, the individual can operate the acoustic signal that it comes to send to the equipment that is called " authenticator ", " validator " or " receiver " the expression secret information, so that based on this people of this signal authentication.Generally acknowledging in those applications, is to have existed the huge mounted infrastructure that is used to receive and send speech and derives from the electronic signal of speech based on the advantage of the token of sound wave.Specifically, existed global telephone system to send the data of representing acoustic information, also have, except phone, the many computing equipments that connected by this same system (being included in the internet) all have microphone and loud speaker (maybe can be easy to be modified as them) now.
As generally acknowledging here, when being used in the ATM environment, the advantage of sonic token is in the mode that stops ATM can forge personal information when not having secret keys the personal information on the token to be sent to ATM.ATM sends to Central Bank's computer to personal information simply and authenticates.Like this, the link of ATM and ATM and bank all need not safety and protects this authentication key element.But the present invention recognizes that also second authentication key element PIN still needs link safety.This is because PIN generally has only 4 to 6 Arabic numerals to form, the assailant can spy upon the link between ATM and the bank, if and communication allows the PIN of conjecture to be verified, the assailant just can test out about 1,000,000 possible PIN values and of remembeing to work simply, can steal token and can visit the account up to the assailant.Therefore, unfortunately, it is essential that the secure communication between bank and the ATM will remain.
Recognize top problem, the invention that here discloses is provided.
Summary of the invention
A kind of authentication method comprises at first to providing PIN and secret PKI such as the such authorization computer of banking computer, sets up communication link then between authorization computer and the such receiver such as ATM away from computer.It is safe that communication link is not limited to.Subsequently, user's acoustic signal can be received machine (for example ATM) and receive, the digital signature that on behalf of private key, signal produce, and receiver is converted to signature signal to acoustic signal.PIN by user for example with data input device that receiver is associated on key in such mode and also be received machine and receive, so PIN and acoustic signal are received dividually.Encrypt the signature signal that obtains an encryption with PIN to signature signal, then the latter is dealt into authorization computer and comes certifying signature to use PIN and secret PKI.
Signature signal is preferably encrypted with PIN by receiver.On the other hand, the most handy hand-held token of acoustic signal sends.The transaction of expectation can be input to receiver, and only after signature was verified, authorization computer just authorized receiver was carried out transaction.
By using PIN to give the ciphering signature decrypted signal to obtain signature signal, signature is verified by authorization computer.Then, the signature signal that is produced uses secret public key verifications.
In a preferred embodiment, token is by producing signature signal to message and private key combination.Described message can comprise at least a portion of timestamp, for example, and than the least significant bit that pre-determines quantity in the timestamp that pre-determines number and have multidigit more.
On the other hand, disclosed that a kind of to be used to be not limited to be the system of the two factor authentication on the safe link.Described system comprises the portable token that produces the wireless signal of representing digital signature message.Receiver receives wireless signal and PIN, and PIN and wireless signal separately receive.Receiver is encrypted the signature information that obtains encrypting with PIN to signature information.The signature information that authorization computer receive to be encrypted by link, and Access PIN and secret PKI are to attempt certifying signature message.
Also have on the other hand, Verification System comprises that Access PIN is with secret PKI and by link and at least one authorization computer of communicating by letter away from the receiver of this computer at least.It is safe that communication link is not limited to.System comprises the device that is used for receiving at receiver the wireless signal represent a digital signature, and described digital front produces by message and private key are combined.Receiver is converted to signature signal to wireless signal.Device in receiver also receives PIN.Generator is encrypted the signature signal of encrypting to produce with PIN to signature signal.The signature signal of encrypting is sent to authorization computer by link, so that use PIN and secret PKI to come certifying signature.
The present invention can better understand with reference to the accompanying drawings about the details of two aspects of its structure and operation.In whole accompanying drawing, identical label identifies corresponding parts.
The accompanying drawing summary
Fig. 1 is based on the block diagram of the system of the present invention of audio authentication; And
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of logic of the present invention.
Preferred embodiment describes in detail
With reference to Fig. 1, shown a system at first, referred generally to be decided to be 10, described system comprises the portable hand-held token 12 that can be configured to key chain or other mini-plant.But, as required, the present invention also can be applied to other token configuration, for example hand-held or portable resembling is placed in the mobile communication station on the vehicles (comprising automobile, truck, canoe, aircraft and train), comprises that kneetop computer, wireless phone or phone, data transceiver or paging and position determine receiver.Wireless Telecom Equipment is called " user " and " moving " also can being called user terminal, mobile radio station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, mobile radio or radio telephone, radio-cell sometimes or resembling in some communication systems simply.
Anyway, token 12 can both produce the acoustic signal that the machine that can be received 16 receives, and schematically shows with many lines 14.Receiver 16 and authorization computer 18 are associated.In illustrative embodiment, receiver 16 is ATM (ATM), authorization computer 18 is bank's master computers, but be appreciated that, receiver 16 can be a receiving equipment, described receiving equipment be associated such as building, family, the vehicles, or use the two factor authentication restriction that any other parts of the visit of authorized user in advance are associated with expectation.It is also understood that, preferred token 12 is sonic token that produce acoustic signal, principle of the present invention can be applied to other wireless signal and generate token, comprises those may use the next digital signature that discloses of electromagnetic wave wireless communication principles (for example such as bluetooth and infrared such radio frequency) below receiver 16 emissions token.
Preferred acoustic signal 14 can be represented the digital signature of the private key generation of using in the electronic data memory 20 that is stored in token 12.Pseudo random number (PN) generator 21 also can be included in the token 12.For simple announcement also can be stored in the there with corresponding secret PKI or secret PKI sign.
According to know in this area and the illustrated private/public key principle of (U.S.) National Institute of Standards and Tech (NIST) Federal Information Processing Standards publication 186-2. .2000 in January, signature algorithm in the token 12 (being carried out by the microprocessor in the token 12 22) receives at least a portion of private key and the message that will be signed as input (thereby and " combination "), add random number " k " from PN generator 21, to produce digital signature, promptly at random to (r, s).Microprocessor 22 is preferably in to be received and carries out signature algorithm from such as the activation signal of the so one or more active elements 24 of toggle switch, voice activation equipment or button the time immediately.Also preferably include in the signal that microprocessor 22 produces by the message of being signed with corresponding to the sign of the secret PKI of private key.Be appreciated that microprocessor 22 can comprise the digital processing unit of knowing in this area, necessary clock, analog to digital conversion circuit and D/A converting circuit.
Microprocessor 22 accesses data memory 20 make that one or more active element can be associated with the respective private keys in the memory 22 when using a plurality of active element 24.The electronic signature signal is sent to audio tweeter 26 so that an electronic signature conversion of signals is an acoustic signal 14.Acoustic signal can be audible, also can be inaudible.If desired, also can provide microphone 28 to receive acoustic signal in token 12 and they are converted to electronic signal, described electronic signal be sent to microprocessor 22 and handles.When using the electromagnetic wave wireless principles, loud speaker 26 is substituted, and is for example replaced by radio frequency sending set or infrared transmitter.
Microphone or other acoustics receiving equipment 30 that preferred acoustic signal 14 is received in the machine 16 receive.Microphone 30 is the acoustic signal conversion sub-signature signal (if desired, also being accompanied by message before secret PKI ID and the initial signature) of wiring back, send to as required then can accesses data memory 34 microprocessor 32.If desired, also can in receiver 16, provide loud speaker 36, receive described signal by the microphone in the token 12 28 so that acoustic signal is sent back to token 12.
When receiver 16 is that ATM and authorization computer 18 are when being Central Bank's computer, authorization computer 18 can comprise a processor 38, and processor 38 accesses data memory 40 are optionally granted and authorized by the digital signature that receives from receiver 16 being verified (or not verifying).Data storage 40 can comprise the data structure as tabulation or database table, the secret PKI (with its ID) that the private key that described data structure storage and represented by signal is associated.In any case because the cryptographic novel usage that discloses below, it is safe that the link 41 of connection bank and ATM need not.
Fig. 2 has shown logic of the present invention.The secret PKI that is associated from square 42 and token 12 and the ID of PKI are provided for authorization computer 18 (for example, main banking computer) together.But also provide user's PIN.This provide process in person or by the safety attachment security finish." secret PKI " be meant with this area in the consistent PKI of private/public key principle known, can not visit publicly except secret PKI but only be provided for the such trusted entity of for example main banking computer.
Move on to square 44, when one of actuator-activated element 24 of user, signature algorithm in the token 12 receive private key, pseudo random number and such as all or part of such message of timestamp as input, to produce electronic signature, for example at random to (r, s).The user is input to receiver 16 to two key elements of authentication then.Especially, at square 46 places, digital signature with wireless mode (for example is, acoustically) and through the signature message together, if desired also and the ID of corresponding secret PKI together, be sent to receiver 16, at square 48 places, the numeric keypad input PIN that the user uses as provides on most ATM.Enter the transaction (as withdrawing deposit, transferring accounts or the like) of expectation at square 50 places.The step that is appreciated that square 46,48 and 50 can be carried out with any order.
According to the present invention, at square 52, receiver 16 usefulness PIN give signature, and (r s) encrypts.This encryption can be to use the symmetric cryptography such as the AES encryption principle.Encrypted signature with the secret PKI ID that does not encrypt and the preceding quilt of signature that not have the to encrypt message (for example, timestamp or its two least significant bits) of signing be sent to host computer processor 38 together.
At square 54, primary processor 38 is deciphered to digital signature with PIN earlier.Then, by using the message before secret PKI ID and the initial signature, processor is searched suitable secret PKI from data storage 40, and comes certifying signature according to the public/private keys principle of knowing in this area.If be proved to be successful, authorization computer 18 is just signaled receiver 16 and is allowed visit.Under the situation of ATM validator 16 and banking computer authorization computer 18, banking computer is signaled ATM and is carried out the transaction of being asked.
The assailant who is appreciated that the ATM-bank correspondence that may intercept on the link 41 now can not derive PIN.Especially, use " correct " PIN to the signature deciphering with use incorrect PIN that it is separated secret meeting to produce equal result: that just can not be understood during certifying signature is right at random, does not just have secret PKI and thing (several least significant bits of noting the only time stamp are sent out) that the data of being signed just can not be finished.This feature has been eliminated on the link 41 the last requirement to fail safe.
Specific " system and method for acoustic two factor authentication " that here at length show and describe can reach the above-described target of the present invention fully, be appreciated that, this is the present preferred embodiment of the present invention, it is the representative of the theme that extensively can conceive of the present invention, scope of the present invention comprises significantly other embodiment that may become to those skilled in the art fully, thereby, scope of the present invention is not subjected to any restriction except appended claims, the element of odd number indication in claims, be not to refer to " one and have only one " outside clearly stating unless, but " one or more ".All structural or functional equivalent specific reference of those of ordinary skill in the art having been known element in the above preferred embodiment that maybe will know, and are included in these claims as reference at this.In addition, the equipment or the method that needn't require the present invention to solve to be devoted to each problem are only because it is comprised in these claims.In addition, of the present invention is to offer to masses without any element, element or method step, does not state in claims clearly no matter this element, element or method step have.Here do not have the claim element to be interpreted as to be under 35 U.S.C § 112 the 6th joint regulation, unless this with " be used for ... device " clearly narration, or this is narrated with " step " rather than " action " under the situation of claim to a method.

Claims (30)

1. an authentication method comprises
PIN and secret PKI are provided at least for authorization computer;
Set up communication link between authorization computer and at least one receiver away from computer, it is safe that communication link is not limited to;
Receive the acoustic signal that at least one represents the signal of at least one private key generation at the receiver place, receiver is converted to signature signal to described acoustic signal;
Receive PIN at the receiver place, PIN and acoustic signal are separated to receive;
Signature signal is encrypted the signature signal of encrypting to produce with PIN; And
The signature signal of encrypting is sent to authorization computer to use PIN and secret public key verifications signature.
2. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, encryption acts is finished at the receiver place.
3. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, uses hand-held token to send described acoustic signal.
4. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, also comprises the transaction of expectation is input to receiver, and only when signature was verified, authorization computer just authorized receiver was carried out transaction.
5. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, signature is checking like this:
Give the signature signal deciphering of encrypting to obtain signature signal with PIN; Then
Use secret PKI to come the certifying signature signal.
6. method as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that, described token produces signature signal by at least one message and private key are combined.
7. method as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that described message comprises the part of at least one timestamp at least.
8. method as claimed in claim 7 is characterized in that, the part of described timestamp is than the least significant bit that pre-determines quantity in the timestamp that pre-determines number and have multidigit more.
One to be not limited to be two factor authentication system on the safe link, comprising:
At least one portable token, it produces at least one wireless signal of representing digital signature message;
At least one receiver, it receives wireless signal and PIN, and PIN and wireless signal are separated to receive, and receiver is encrypted signature information to obtain encrypting with PIN to signature information; And
At least one authorization computer, it receives the signature information of at least one encryption on link, and authorization computer Access PIN and secret PKI are to attempt certifying signature message;
10. system as claimed in claim 9 is characterized in that, described wireless signal is also represented the ID of secret PKI and at least corresponding to the message after the private key signature of PKI, to obtain the message of digital signature.
11. system as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that, the message that described receiver sends ciphering signature message, ID and signed to authorization computer.
12. system as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that, described authorization computer uses PIN to the ciphering signature decrypted signal, and by using ID and using secret PKI addressing machine Migong key to come certifying signature message.
13. a Verification System that comprises authorization computer, described authorization computer are visited at least one PIN and communicated by letter away from the receiver of computer with at least one with a secret PKI and by link, it is safe that communication link is not limited to, and described system comprises:
Receive the device of at least one representative from the wireless signal of at least one digital signature of private key generation at the receiver place, described receiver is converted to signature signal to wireless signal;
Be used for receiving the device of PIN at the receiver place; And
With PIN signature signal is encrypted producing the device of ciphering signature signal, described ciphering signature signal is sent to authorization computer by link so that use described PIN and secret PKI comes certifying signature.
14. system as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that, the described device that is used for encrypting is at receiver.
15. system as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that, also comprises the device that uses hand-held token to send wireless signal.
16. system as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that, also comprises the device that the transaction of expectation is input to receiver, only when signature was verified, authorization computer just authorized receiver was carried out transaction.
17. system as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that, comprising:
Use PIN to the device of ciphering signature decrypted signal with the generation signature signal; And
Use the device of secret public key verifications signature signal.
18. system as claimed in claim 15 is characterized in that, described token produces signature signal by at least one message and private key are combined.
19. system as claimed in claim 18 is characterized in that, described message comprises at least a portion of at least one timestamp.
20. system as claimed in claim 18 is characterized in that, described message also with the pseudo random number combination.
21. system as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that, described wireless signal is an acoustic signal.
22. system as claimed in claim 9 is characterized in that, described wireless signal is an acoustic signal.
23. a computer readable medium comprises the program that the control computer system is carried out a kind of method, described method comprises:
Provide at least one PIN and a secret PKI to authorization computer;
Set up communication link between authorization computer and at least one receiver away from computer, it is safe that communication link is not limited to;
Receive the acoustic signal that at least one represents the signal of at least one private key generation at the receiver place, receiver is converted to signature signal to described acoustic signal;
Receive PIN at the receiver place, PIN and acoustic signal are separated to receive;
With PIN signature signal is encrypted to produce the ciphering signature signal; And
The ciphering signature signal is sent to authorization computer to use PIN and secret public key verifications signature.
24. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 23 is characterized in that, described encryption acts is finished at the receiver place.
25. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 23 is characterized in that, also comprises using hand-held token to send described acoustic signal.
26. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 23 is characterized in that, also comprises the transaction of expectation is input to receiver, only when signature was verified, authorization computer just authorized receiver was carried out transaction.
27. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 23 is characterized in that, signature is checking like this:
With PIN to the ciphering signature decrypted signal to produce signature signal; Then
Use the described signature signal of secret public key verifications.
28. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 25 is characterized in that, described token produces signature signal by at least one message and private key are combined.
29. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 28 is characterized in that, described message comprises at least a portion of at least one timestamp.
30. computer readable medium as claimed in claim 29 is characterized in that, the part of described timestamp is than the least significant bit that pre-determines quantity in the timestamp that pre-determines number and have multidigit more.
CNA038070316A 2002-02-15 2003-02-12 System and method for acoustic two factor authentication Pending CN1650603A (en)

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US10/077,365 US7251730B2 (en) 2001-12-21 2002-02-15 Method and apparatus for simplified audio authentication
US10/077,365 2002-02-15
US10/139,873 2002-05-06
US10/139,873 US7966497B2 (en) 2002-02-15 2002-05-06 System and method for acoustic two factor authentication

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