TWI322609B - System and method for authenticating clients in a client-server environment - Google Patents
System and method for authenticating clients in a client-server environment Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F17/00—Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted for specific functions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/02—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/22—Parsing or analysis of headers
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- Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
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_、.發說明 【發明所屬之技術領域】 ’特別是與在一用戶端-伺服端 大體上本發明係與認證有關 環境中的e -a相關’更為特別的係與網際網路環境中的用戶認證 有關。 【先前技術】 譌證是一種決定某人.或某事在實際上是否是其所被聲明的 人或事的程序。在私人或公共電腦網路中認證通常通過登錄密碼 的使用而被執仃。-般而言,每—台伺服器維持其自身資料的穩 定性以儲存認證資料。所以,在-台飼服器為用戶所利用的密碼 在另-台舰器中可能已經被另—用戶鎖定。此會增加用戶必須 記住並維持不同認證設置的數量。在料以不同用戶認證系統(例 如,通過一入口词服器存取一應用,該入口飼服器使用其自備的 用戶資料庫)分佈在數台飼服器之應用中,用戶必須登錄—次以 上。 。允許單個簽署的工作區包括諸如在入口飼服器上為應用飼 服器儲存登錄資料、或者諸如Micr〇s〇ft,s® net pas邛㈣ (httP://www.passport_com)的集中用戶資料庫的使用、或者來自 特許應用的特許權(http://www.projectliberty〇rg)的方法。伴隨此 方法需要用戶願意將其個人資料與所有的資料安全問題儲存在 第三方網點。同樣’如果身分認證服務(Passp〇rtservice)癱瘓掉, 即使在某人想使用的網點可用的前提下,該人也無法登錄到其所 需的服務上。_,. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ User authentication related. [Prior Art] A testimony is a procedure that determines whether a person or something is actually the person or thing that it is declared. Authentication on a private or public computer network is usually enforced by the use of a login password. In general, each server maintains the stability of its own data to store authentication data. Therefore, the password used by the user in the -Taiwan service may have been locked by another user in another. This increases the number of different authentication settings that users must remember and maintain. In the application of a plurality of user authentication systems (for example, accessing an application through an entry word server, the portal feeder uses its own user database), the user must log in— More than once. . Allowing a single signed work area includes, for example, storing login data for an application server on an inlet feeder, or centralized user data such as Micr〇s〇ft, s® net pas邛 (4) (httP://www.passport_com) The use of the library, or the method of the franchise from the licensed application (http://www.projectliberty〇rg). Along with this approach, users are willing to store their personal data and all data security issues at third-party outlets. Similarly, if the authentication service (Passp〇rtservice) is lost, even if the outlet that someone wants to use is available, the person cannot log in to the service they need.
5 使用用戶身份/密碼設置認證同樣存在缺點,它將導致額外 的網路堵塞。對於-用戶請求,該聽器不得不通過詢問登錄資 /:、式回應用戶端。唯有在其被提供以後,初始被請求的資訊 才會被送返該用戶端(同樣見下面的第7A圖)。 最後,费碼通常容易被盜取、意外地被揭露或輕易的被遺忘。 〇 由於這些原因,網際網路交易和許多其他的事物需要一更為 嚴格遵寸規則的認證程序。由憑證機構(CA)所出版並檢驗的數 位憑證作為公共錄匙基礎架構的一部分,被認為是在網際網路上 執行認證的標準方法。 數位簽名使接收端(伺服器)能夠鐾別發送端(用戶端)的 身伤以及其來源和文件的完整性。 數位簽名係基於非對稱密碼運演算法則的。文檔有發送者的 私人输匙簽署。接收端即可以獲取該發送端的公共毅,它通過 被仏任的第二方提供給該接收端,並且驗證所接收文件的完整 性。 在伺服器端和用戶端一數位簽名程序在一已經存在密碼登 錄的=統中執行需要魔大的變革,例如,額外的帶有特殊安全應 用的项卡機。所以’伴隨著僅僅新的用戶端词服器端結構適合於 使用數位簽名程序的結果,此類的執行就引起了在花費和時間上 的所付出的£大努力。在用戶端飼服器端環境中兩種認證程序的 存在有;F系j目素暨一用戶端不得不在最初核對該目標飼服器是 否支援該密褐登錄或數位簽名程序。依賴上述結果,用戶端將使 用由祠服H端所支援的需要認證程序。既然飼服器端應用本身最 n ··、疋且的類型,這就導致了在用戶端和伺服器端不必要的網 1322609 路堵塞β 更進一步的’現存的數位簽名認證程序有一不利因素暨在用 戶端和伺服器端之間的幾個螢幕不得不在用戶端和伺服器端轉換 直到用戶能夠提供其認證資訊。這也引起了諸多不必要的網路堵 塞。 【發明内容】 由此開始,本發明的目標是在一用戶端_伺服器端環埤中提 供一認證用戶端的方法和系統並且避免上文所提及先前技藝的不 利因素。 本發明的概念是用一新的數位簽名認證程序取代現有基於 認證程序的密碼/用戶身份,在數位簽名認證程序中,第一個Ηττρ 一請求標題較佳係藉用戶端認證資訊而擴展,而不受該目的端伺 服器所用的認證程序所支配且無須伺服器請求認證資訊。認證資 訊較佳包括由憑證機構所簽署包含用戶端公共鑰起的用戶端憑 證’以及透過請求傳収町丁卜請求標㈣料所計#之雜凑值 (hash value),並且與用戶端的私人鑰匙一起被加密。憑證和數位 簽名在用户端系統本身中建立Ηττρ一請求標題時被增加,或者可 在後來在伺服器令作為閘道、代理或通道而被增加。 不支援新的數位簽名認證程序的目的端伺服器會很輕易的 忽視在HTTP-請求標題中的憑證和數位簽名並且自動啟動它自 己的證程序。本發日月簡化了現存的數位簽名認證程序同時在沒 有改變HTTP協定或引起不必要的網路堵塞的前提下允許不同認 證程序的共同存在。 7 1322609 【實施方式】 關於第1A圖和第1B圖,其描述了本發明可較佳使用之用 戶端-伺服器端環境。然而’應當指出的是,本發明可以使用在每 一個允許標題擴展而且不違背普通協定用法的通訊協定用戶端· 飼服器端環境中。所以,本奋明以及其首選的實施例可以被描述 和解釋在當前大多數已知的HTTP-協定令。 該HTTP-協定(超文件傳輸協定)是用於分散式系統的應 用層協定。它是一套用於交換檔(文本、圖片、圖像、聲音、視 頻和其他多媒體檔)的規則。任何網路伺服器3包含一 HTTP-郵 件收發程式或者所謂的HTTP-伺服器4, 一被設計來等待HTTP-請求並且當其到達時處理此類請求的程式。更進一步,每一台用 戶端機器1包含一網路瀏覽器或所謂的Ηττρ_用戶端2,發送請求 到網路伺服器3。當瀏覽器使用者通過打開一網路檔(鍵入一統一 資源定位)或者點擊一超鏈結輸入請求,瀏覽器將建立一 HTTP-請求並且將其發送到顯示於URL中的網際網路協議位址。在目標 伺服赛.3中的HTTP-祠服器4接收到請求並且在處理後,請求文 件被返回。在另一個用戶端_伺服器端環境中,用戶端〗通過閘道、 通道或代理伺服器5 (見第1圖B)與該伺服器3通訊。 通常HTTP在TCP/IP (傳輸控制協定/網路協定)上發生, 然而HTTP並不依賴於TCP/IP。 TCP定義了一套規則以在資訊包層與其他網路節點交換資 訊,IP定義了 一套規則以在網際網路位址層發送和接收資訊。5 Setting up authentication with a user ID/password also has the disadvantage that it will cause additional network congestion. For the user request, the listener has to respond to the client by asking for the login /:. The initial requested information will only be sent back to the client after it has been provided (see also Figure 7A below). Finally, fee codes are often easily stolen, accidentally exposed, or easily forgotten. 〇 For these reasons, Internet transactions and many other things require a more rigorous compliance process. The digital certificate published and verified by the Certificate Authority (CA) is considered part of the public keying infrastructure and is considered the standard method of performing authentication on the Internet. The digital signature enables the receiving end (server) to identify the physical injury of the sender (the client) and the integrity of its source and file. The digital signature is based on an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. The document has the sender's private key sign. The receiving end can obtain the public opinion of the transmitting end, and it is provided to the receiving end by the second party to be served, and verifies the integrity of the received file. A digital signature program on the server side and the client side performs a change in the system that already has password registration, for example, an additional item card machine with a special security application. So, with the result that only the new client-side server-side structure is suitable for using digital signature programs, the execution of such a class has caused a lot of effort in terms of cost and time. There are two authentication procedures in the client-side device environment; the F-system and the user have to verify whether the target server supports the dense brown registration or digital signature program. Depending on the above results, the client will use the authentication required program supported by the H-end. Since the application of the server is the most n · ·, and the type of the application itself, this leads to unnecessary network 1322609 blocking at the user end and the server side. Further, the existing digital signature authentication program has a disadvantage. Several screens between the client and the server have to be switched between the client and the server until the user is able to provide their authentication information. This also caused a lot of unnecessary network congestion. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Starting from this, it is an object of the present invention to provide a method and system for authenticating a client in a client-server loop and avoiding the disadvantages of the prior art mentioned above. The concept of the present invention replaces the existing password/user identity based on the authentication program with a new digital signature authentication program. In the digital signature authentication program, the first Ηττρ request title is preferably extended by the client authentication information. It is not subject to the authentication procedure used by the destination server and does not require the server to request authentication information. Preferably, the authentication information includes a client-side credential signed by the credential institution including the public key of the client, and a hash value calculated by requesting the receipt of the request (four), and is private to the client. The keys are encrypted together. The credential and digital signature are incremented when the 标题ττρ-request header is established in the client system itself, or may be added later as a gateway, proxy or channel in the server. A destination server that does not support the new digital signature authentication program will easily ignore the credentials and digital signatures in the HTTP-request header and automatically launch its own credentials. This release date simplifies the existing digital signature authentication program and allows different authentication procedures to coexist without changing the HTTP protocol or causing unnecessary network congestion. 7 1322609 [Embodiment] With regard to Figs. 1A and 1B, a user-server end environment in which the present invention can be preferably used is described. However, it should be noted that the present invention can be used in every communication protocol client-side environment that allows for header extensions and does not violate common protocol usage. Therefore, Benfing and its preferred embodiments can be described and explained in most currently known HTTP-Agreement Orders. The HTTP-Protocol (Hyper File Transfer Protocol) is an application layer protocol for distributed systems. It is a set of rules for exchanging files (text, pictures, images, sounds, videos, and other multimedia files). Any web server 3 contains an HTTP-mail transceiver or so-called HTTP-server 4, a program designed to wait for HTTP-requests and process such requests when they arrive. Further, each of the client machines 1 includes a web browser or so-called τττρ_user 2 to send a request to the web server 3. When the browser user enters a request by opening a web file (type a uniform resource location) or clicking a hyperlink, the browser will create an HTTP request and send it to the internet protocol bit displayed in the URL. site. The HTTP-server 4 in the target server.3 receives the request and after processing, the request file is returned. In another client-server environment, the client communicates with the server 3 via a gateway, channel or proxy server 5 (see Figure 1B). Usually HTTP occurs on TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Network Protocol), whereas HTTP does not rely on TCP/IP. TCP defines a set of rules for exchanging information with other network nodes at the packet level. IP defines a set of rules for sending and receiving information at the Internet address layer.
-個HTTP-請求標題包含Ηττρ方法(GET , head,p〇ST- HTTP-request header contains Ηττρ method (GET , head, p〇ST
[s ] 8 1322609 等等),通用資源識別字(URI ),協議譯文和可選擇的追加資訊。 一個HTTP-應答包含一狀態行,它指出了請求成功或者失 敗,在應答中的資訊描述(在資訊之後)和實際的資訊請求。 至於第2圖,這是一先前技藝HTTP-請求標題基本架構的 描述。每一個HTTP-請求必須包含至少一個標題。僅僅只有HTTP-郵件請求包含標題和大量資料。下文的資訊是被適宜的包含在 HTTP-標題中的: 被HTTP-請求所存取的資源(例如,檔、伺服系統等) 4司服器的主機名(例如,www.ibm.com ) 劉覽器名和版本(例如,Netscape Version 7.1 ) 用戶端作業系統(例如,Windows XP ) 能被瀏覽器理解的特徵設置(例如,ISO-8859-1 ) 每一個HTTP-標題可以包括沒有被HTTP-協議所定義的, 與現有的使用HTTP-協議的應用不衝突的補充資訊。這意味著一 使用HTTP-協議並且沒有被設置成處理補充資訊的應用可以很簡 單的忽視該補充資訊並且不打擾其執行。 至於第3圖,描述了依照本發明的11丁丁?-請求標題的富有 創造性的結構。依照本發明,下述的附加資訊必須被包括在HTTP-請求標題中: 用戶端憑證包括公共鑰匙並且由一憑證機構所簽署,並且數 位簽名在HTTP-請求標題以及如果存在的HTTP-主體(Post)上被 計算。憑證和數位簽名可以被伺服器上的特定工具所處理。一用 戶端憑證是一個被信任的第三方組織所分配的文件,其會將一把 公共鑰匙與一特定的人相結合。該被信任的組織會確保包含在憑 9 1322609 證中的資訊是有效的和正確的。憑證被5〇9所標準化。他們應當 包含被彳§任第三方組織的數位簽名,擁有公共鑰匙的人的姓名和 公共鑰匙本身。 關於第4A圖至第4C圖,這裏有被描述的首選的實施例以 將用戶端憑證和數位簽名插入到Ηττρ_請求標題中。 .關於第4A圖,這裏描述了本發.明的第一個實施例將用戶端 憑證16連同數位簽名18插入到HTTPjt求標題12中。該用戶端 系統1包含一帶有簽名能力的瀏覽器2。瀏覽器2生成一 HTTPS'求標題 12, 存取被安全儲 存在本地檔系 統中的 用戶端私人鑰 廷,加密一由HTTP-請求標題ή和如果存在的實體所產生的混亂 信號值,連同該私人鑰匙導致—數位簽名18。該數位簽名18連同 包含公共鑰匙的用戶端憑證16被插入在Ηττρ_請求標題12中。 該被擴展的HTTP-請求標題14被發送到初始化認證程序的Ηττρ_ 伺服器4中。可以作為HTTP-伺服器的一部分或作為—獨立存在 的元件的認證元件6從該HTTP-請求標題中校驗該用戶端憑證資 訊16。校驗的工作可以通過檢查憑證機構的憑證簽名被執行也 可以通過與包含於憑證資料庫9中的已知憑證相比較的方式被執 行。使用包含於用戶端憑證16中的公共鑰匙,包含於Ηττρ請求 標題12中的數位簽名18被解譯為由用戶端系統丨所計算的雜湊 值。運用相同的雜凑值運演算法則,該雜湊值在11丁丁1>_請求標題 12和如果存在的主體中被計算。如果雜湊值匹配認證被完成並且 認證成功,則會授與某個應用8的存取權。 關於第4B圖’這襄描述了本發明的第二個實施例將用戶端 憑證18連同數位簽名16插入到HTTP請求標題12中。現在該瀏[s] 8 1322609 etc.), Universal Resource Identification (URI), protocol translation and optional additional information. An HTTP-response contains a status line that indicates the success or failure of the request, a description of the information in the response (after the message), and the actual information request. As for Figure 2, this is a description of the basic architecture of a prior art HTTP-request header. Every HTTP-request must contain at least one title. Only HTTP-mail requests contain titles and lots of material. The information below is appropriately included in the HTTP-title: Resources accessed by HTTP-requests (eg, files, servos, etc.) 4 hostname of the server (eg, www.ibm.com) Browser name and version (for example, Netscape Version 7.1) Client operating system (for example, Windows XP) Feature settings that can be understood by the browser (for example, ISO-8859-1) Each HTTP-title can include no HTTP-protocol Defined, supplemental information that does not conflict with existing applications that use the HTTP-protocol. This means that an application that uses the HTTP-protocol and is not set to process supplemental information can simply ignore the supplemental information and not bother its execution. As for the third figure, the 11-butyl is described in accordance with the present invention. - Request a rich creative structure of the title. In accordance with the present invention, the additional information described below must be included in the HTTP-Request header: The client credential includes the public key and is signed by a credential authority, and the digital signature is in the HTTP-Request header and if there is an HTTP-Principal (Post) ) is calculated. Credentials and digital signatures can be processed by specific tools on the server. A client credential is a file assigned by a trusted third party organization that combines a public key with a specific person. The trusted organization will ensure that the information contained in the certificate in accordance with 9 1322609 is valid and correct. The voucher is standardized by 5〇9. They should include the digital signature of the third-party organization, the name of the person who owns the public key, and the public key itself. With respect to Figures 4A through 4C, there is a preferred embodiment described herein for inserting client credentials and digital signatures into the Ηττρ_ request header. With respect to Figure 4A, the first embodiment of the present invention is described herein as inserting the client credential 16 along with the digit signature 18 into the HTTPjt request header 12. The client system 1 includes a browser 2 with signature capabilities. The browser 2 generates an HTTPS 'question header 12, accesses the private key of the client stored securely in the local file system, encrypts a messy signal value generated by the HTTP-request header and if present, along with the The private key leads to a digital signature of 18. The digital signature 18 is inserted in the Ηττρ_ request header 12 along with the client credential 16 containing the public key. The extended HTTP-request header 14 is sent to the Ηττρ_ server 4 of the initialization authentication program. The client credential information 16 can be verified from the HTTP-Request header as part of the HTTP-server or as an authentication element 6 of the independently-existing component. The verification work can be performed by checking the voucher signature of the voucher authority or by comparing it with the known voucher included in the voucher repository 9. Using the public key contained in the client credential 16, the digit signature 18 contained in the Ηττρ request header 12 is interpreted as a hash value calculated by the client system 丨. Using the same hash value algorithm, the hash value is calculated in 11 Ding 1 > request header 12 and if present. If the hash value match authentication is completed and the authentication is successful, access to an application 8 is granted. With regard to FIG. 4B, the second embodiment of the present invention describes the insertion of the client credential 18 along with the digital signature 16 into the HTTP request header 12. Now the liu
[SI 10 1322609 見器2擁有通過一智慧卡閱讀器10同智慧卡10通訊的功能。該 瀏覽器2生成—Ηττρ_請求標題’建立與該智慧卡1〇的通訊’在 其女全模組中包含—私人鑰匙和用戶端憑證的智慧卡10解譯在 HTTP-標題及其如果存在的主體上生成的雜湊值,伴隨該私人鑰匙 (數位簽名)’ 一數位簽名18連同用戶端憑證16 —起返回到該瀏 覽器2β包含公共鑰匙的數位簽名18連同用戶端憑證16被插入在 HTTP-請求標題12中。通過使用一認證元件(見第4α圖的描述), 該被擴展的HTTP-請求標題14被發送到初始化認證程序的HTTP-伺服器4中。 關於第4C圖’這襄描述了本發明的第三個實施例將用戶端 憑證16連同數位簽名1 8插入到HTTP-請求標題12中。在第三個 實施例中,該用戶端系統包含一自身所擁有的簽名元件2〇。讓元 件擔當一代理伺服器的角色運行在與該瀏覽器2同在的用戶端系 統1上。該瀏覽器2被配置來使用該代理伺服器2〇。源於此,該 劉覽器2發送規則的HTTP-請求標題12到該簽名元件20中,然 後該簽名元件20將該憑證16和數字簽名18的類似體插入到上文 所描述的實施例當中。通過使用一認證元件(見第4A圖的描述), 該被擴展的HTTP -睛求標題.被發送到初始化認證程序的ηττρ_^ 服器4中。 關於第4D圖’這裏描述了本發明的第四個實施例將用戶端 憑證18連同數位簽名16插入到HTTP-請求標題12中。在該實施 例中,該用戶端-請求(la/2a ; lb/2b )係通過一具有插入元件2〇 的代理伺服器22被發送。該插入元件20同一包含私人输匙和其 簽署憑證的編碼硬體24對話,該編碼硬體24將用私人输起(數 位簽名)加密由HTTp-請求標題12和其如果存在的主體生成的一 雜溱值,並且通過將其插入到HTTPjf求標題的方式,將數位簽 名18連同該用戶端憑證16返回到該插入元件20。該被擴展的 HTTP-請求標s 14通過使用認證元件(見第4A圖的描述)被發 送到初始化認證程序的Ηττρ伺服器4中。 總之,因為本發明描述了在Ηττρ協定中的附加標題資料, 現存的能夠處理標題中附加資料的伺服器端和用戶端的所有元件 可以協同工作。如果其中一套系統不能處理額外資料,所有的事 物都將如現今已知的方式工作。 為了保持上億的已安裝的用戶端瀏覽器現存的基礎,一附加 簽名軟體通過在本地用戶端機器上(見第4C圖)擔當代理元件的 角色,可以處理HTTP擴展。在公司的網路中(例如企業内部互 聯網),這甚至可以被一中央代理伺服器所處理(第4(:圖)。在將 來的網路瀏覽器版本中可以固定該功能性(第4A圖)。用這種方 法到新範例的過渡可以隨著時間的遷移而發生。 數位簽名可以通過使用一簽名智慧卡或任何其他的簽名硬 體被建立。同樣,一使用儲存在用戶端電腦上的編碼鍵的純軟體 解決方案也是可能被執行的。 第5圖顯示了使用本發明的伺服器端_用戶端通話環境的範 例0 在這個範例中假定通過一入口伺服器3 一應用程式5被存 取。在這種技術狀態中,該情形通過將用戶端的認證資料儲存在 該入口伺服器3和該應用伺服器5可以存取的伺服器上(例如, 微軟公司的.NET通行證)或者用於該應用伺服器的認證資料需要[SI 10 1322609 See 2 has the function of communicating with the smart card 10 through a smart card reader 10. The browser 2 generates - Ηττρ_ request title 'establishing communication with the smart card 1' in its female full module containing - private key and client side credentials of the smart card 10 interpreted in the HTTP-title and if it exists The hash value generated on the body, along with the private key (digital signature) 'a digital signature 18 along with the client credential 16 is returned to the browser 2β. The digital signature 18 containing the public key is inserted in the HTTP along with the client credential 16 - Request header 12. The extended HTTP-request header 14 is sent to the HTTP-server 4 that initializes the authentication program by using an authentication element (see description of Figure 4a). With respect to FIG. 4C, the third embodiment of the present invention describes the insertion of the client credential 16 together with the digital signature 18 into the HTTP-request header 12. In a third embodiment, the client system includes a signature component 2 owned by itself. The role of the component acting as a proxy server runs on the client system 1 that is co-located with the browser 2. The browser 2 is configured to use the proxy server 2〇. From this, the viewer 2 sends a regular HTTP-request header 12 to the signature component 20, and then the signature component 20 inserts the similarity of the credential 16 and the digital signature 18 into the embodiment described above. . By using an authentication element (see description of Fig. 4A), the extended HTTP-eyes are sent to the ηττρ_ server 4 of the initialization authentication program. Regarding the 4D FIGURE, a fourth embodiment of the present invention is described herein for inserting the client credential 18 along with the digit signature 16 into the HTTP-request header 12. In this embodiment, the client-request (la/2a; lb/2b) is sent via a proxy server 22 having an interleave element 2〇. The plug-in component 20 is in the same conversation with the encoding hardware 24 containing the private key and its signed credentials, which will be encrypted with a private transmission (digital signature) by the HTTp-request header 12 and its generated body if present. The hash value is returned to the plug-in element 20 along with the client credential 16 by inserting it into the HTTPjf for the title. The extended HTTP-request flag s 14 is sent to the Ηττρ server 4 which initializes the authentication program by using the authentication element (see the description of Fig. 4A). In summary, because the present invention describes additional header data in the Ηττρ protocol, all existing components of the server and client that are capable of processing additional data in the header can work together. If one of the systems is unable to process additional information, all things will work as they are known today. In order to maintain the existing foundation of hundreds of millions of installed client browsers, an additional signature software can handle HTTP extensions by acting as a proxy component on the local client machine (see Figure 4C). In the company's network (such as the corporate intranet), this can even be handled by a central proxy server (4th: Figure). This functionality can be fixed in future web browser versions (Figure 4A) The transition to the new paradigm in this way can occur over time. Digital signatures can be created using a signed smart card or any other signature hardware. Similarly, one is stored on the client computer. A pure software solution for the coded key is also possible. Figure 5 shows an example of a server-side call environment using the present invention. In this example, it is assumed that an application 5 is stored via an entry server 3. In this state of the art, the situation is obtained by storing the authentication data of the client on the server accessible by the portal server 3 and the application server 5 (for example, Microsoft Corporation's .NET passport) or The authentication information of the application server needs
[S 12 1322609 被儲存在該入口祠服器3上的方式被處理。兩種方法都需要使用 者將他/她的資料存放在服從許多安全協定的第三方組織系統上。 如在第4A圖至第4D圖中所解釋的那樣,通過數位化的簽 署明求’沒有一台飼服裔需要健存用戶資料。該入口词服器3可 以對照其用戶資料庫4檢查請求者的身份,將請求傳遞到該應用 伺服器5 ’該應用伺服器可以使用其用戶資料庫6做相同的事情。 用戶端la通過該入口伺服器3存取該應用伺服器5而用戶端lb 可以直接存取該應用伺服器5。該應用伺服器5可以使用其自身的 用戶資料庫6為用戶重新得到輪摩資訊。 既然該應用伺服器5可能僅僅想處理那些通過該入口伺服 器3的請求,這種方法甚至提供了更高的安全性。在這種情況下, 該入口伺服器3傳送請求並且還簽署之。這使得應用伺服器檢查 兩套簽名以允許或拒絕對其服務的存取。用戶端la將獲得對該應 用伺服器5的存取權而用戶端lb將不會被服務因為他的請求沒有 通過該入口伺服器3» 關於第6圖,這裏描述了依照本發明鑑定一資料流程。用戶 端瀏覽器準備好對伺服器10的請求。在本發明一個適當的實施例 中將檢查HTTP-請求標題的簽署是否在2〇中轉換。如果沒有,用 戶端瀏覽器將發送一沒有被簽署的請求給伺服器4〇並且該伺服器 將檢查簽署50是否被需要。如果簽署被需要,伺服器可以發送一 錯誤資訊給用戶端50。如果不需要簽署’該伺服器將提供對所需 資訊60的存取權。 如果簽署在用戶端瀏覽器上被轉換,憑證和數位簽名將被插 入到HTTP.請求標财並且將該Ηττρ請求標題發送給該祠服器 13 ί S1 1322609 30。通過設置特殊域的搜索途徑到HTTP請求標題,該伺服器能 夠從憑證(認證)35重新找到請求者的身份。 用戶端的憑證係包含請求者的姓名和公共鑰匙。 因為它是被一被信任的機構所簽署的,該伺服器能夠檢查出 它是一被被信任的機構所發佈的有效的憑證。確認資訊確實是被 憑證擁有者所發送是可能的,因為僅僅只有屬於憑證的私人鑰匙 的擁有者能夠在HTTP-請求標題中生成數位簽名值,該數位簽名 值能夠在HTTP-請求標題資料之上被計算,並且可以通過包含在 憑證中的公共錄匙的使用被癌認.。如果鑑定是成功的,該祠服器 將提供對所請求資料60的存取權。 關於第7A圖及第7B圖,這裏描述了較之使用本發明富有 創造力的鑑定程序’使用先前技藝鑑定程序在網路瀏覽器(用戶 端)和網路伺服器(伺服器段)交換資訊的特定情節。 例如,在一交易過程中,該用戶端接受/發送資料(例如, 一系列的文本或超文件語言頁面或諸如xml的格式化資料區段) 自/到表現線上購物系統飼服器端,直到訂單被一特殊資料傳輸操 作(例如HTTP郵件)所確認。在今天的應用中,在這個過程中, 該伺服器發佈一請求以從用戶端獲得使用者的身份和密碼。在其 被用戶端應用發送到伺服器端之前,使用者不得不手工提供這些 資料(見第7A圖)。 在一對應於本發明的應用中(見第7B圖),用戶端通過數 位簽名的手段簽署被發送到伺服器端的HTTP-請求標題資料。該 祠服器通過簽名很容易的識別出用戶端。既然每一個被傳輸的資 料項目都與使用者的身份相關,所以沒有必要請求或提供使用者 ί S] 14 1322609 身份和密碼。該伺服器可以重新獲得被儲存的這種用戶端的資訊 並且使用這些資訊準備將被傳送給用户端的資料(個性化,輪廓 頁面)。用來表現個性化的資料的範例是使用者的位址(定購的項 目被送到什麼地方),使用者的購物歷史,使用者的購物車,在最 後一次通話尹所存取的網頁等等。 通過檢查使用者的身份(可以在流程中的任何時間被執 行)’該伺服器可以發現使用者以前璆來沒有存取過這個網址。那 麼該伺服器可以發送包含一指定用戶喜好和詳細用戶資料(輪廓 頁面)的請求的資料。使用者提供這些資料,用戶端應用將其發 送給傅服n並且舰n儲存這些用於在其轉料㈣化設置的 資料。 由於每一個資料傳輸都被簽署,用戶端的使用者身分會儘可 能在劉覽第-個網頁時即被舰器所知曉。在整個過程中個人化 置可因此較早發生。當使用者選擇關閉簽署飼服器識別出這 一事實並且發送-包含指示打開簽署或者取而代之使用傳統使用 者身份/密碼的特定情節的(沒有顯示)的頁面。 【圖式簡單說明】 本發明上文所提及的,剌附加的目標,特徵和有利因素將 在下文的詳細文字描述中顯現。 本發明的新賴特徵將在附加㈣請專利範圍中被闡述。當與 附隨的圖式協力被閱讀的時候,本發明本身,並且,與一首選的 ^用模式,更進-步的目標和關於它的有利因素都將會通過提及 下文的-圖解實施例的詳細描述方式而被充分的理解,其中: 15 叫 2609 第夏圖A/B顯示了 HTTP-用戶端_词服器端環境中的先前技 藝’其中本發明係被適合地使用; 第2圖顯示了 HTTP-標題中一典型先前技藝的基本結構; 第3圓顯示了帶有憑證和數位簽名的Ηττρ標題的有創造 性結構; 第4A-4D圖顯示了將憑證與數位簽名一同插入到Ηττρ標 題t的首選實施例,導致了 HTTP-請求標題有創造性的結構; 第5圖顯示了使用本發明一伺服器_用戶端通話環境的範 例; 第6圖顯示了在一用戶端-伺服器端環境中根據第丨圖A使 用HTTP明求有創造性結構的認證資料流程的—選實施例;及 第7A,7B圖顯示了—基於一線上購物交易程序例子的先前 技藝認證程序和本發明富有創造性認證程序的對比。 【主要元件符號說明】 2 HTTP-用戶端 4 HTTP-伺服器 6用戶資料庫 9 認證資料庫 12 HTTP-請求標題 16用戶端憑證 20簽名元件 24編碼硬體 1用戶端機器 3 網路伺服器 5 代理伺服器 8 應用 1 〇智慧卡閱讀器 14被擴展的HTTP-請求標題 18數位簽名 22代理伺服器 60所請求資料 16[S 12 1322609 is stored in the manner of being stored on the portal server 3. Both methods require the user to store his/her data on a third-party organization system that is subject to many security protocols. As explained in Figures 4A through 4D, the digital signature requires that no one serving a person needs to store user data. The portal word processor 3 can check the identity of the requester against its user database 4 and pass the request to the application server 5'. The application server can use its user database 6 to do the same thing. The client 1 accesses the application server 5 through the portal server 3 and the client lb can directly access the application server 5. The application server 5 can use its own user database 6 to retrieve the wheel information for the user. Since the application server 5 may only want to process requests through the portal server 3, this method even provides higher security. In this case, the portal server 3 transmits the request and also signs it. This causes the application server to check both sets of signatures to allow or deny access to their services. The client la will gain access to the application server 5 and the client lb will not be served because his request did not pass through the portal server. 3» Regarding Figure 6, a data identification is identified in accordance with the present invention. Process. The client browser is ready to request the server 10. In a suitable embodiment of the invention it will be checked if the signature of the HTTP-Request header is translated in 2〇. If not, the user browser will send a request that is not signed to the server 4 and the server will check if the sign 50 is needed. The server can send an error message to the client 50 if the signature is needed. If no signing is required, the server will provide access to the required information 60. If the signature is converted on the client browser, the credential and digital signature will be inserted into the HTTP. request header and the Ηττρ request header will be sent to the server 13 ί S1 1322609 30. By setting the search path of the special domain to the HTTP request header, the server can re-discover the identity of the requester from the credential (authentication) 35. The client's credentials contain the requester's name and public key. Because it is signed by a trusted authority, the server can check that it is a valid credential issued by a trusted authority. It is possible to confirm that the information is indeed sent by the certificate owner, since only the owner of the private key belonging to the voucher can generate a digital signature value in the HTTP-request header, which can be above the HTTP-request header data. It is calculated and can be recognized by the use of the public key contained in the voucher. If the authentication is successful, the server will provide access to the requested material 60. With regard to Figures 7A and 7B, it is described herein that the inventive authentication procedure is used to exchange information between a web browser (client) and a web server (server segment) using prior art authentication procedures. Specific episode. For example, during a transaction, the client accepts/sends the material (eg, a series of text or hypertext language pages or a formatted data section such as xml) from/to the online shopping system, until The order is confirmed by a special data transfer operation (such as HTTP mail). In today's application, during this process, the server issues a request to obtain the user's identity and password from the client. The user has to manually provide this information before it is sent to the server by the client application (see Figure 7A). In an application corresponding to the present invention (see Figure 7B), the UE signs the HTTP-Request header data sent to the server by means of a digital signature. The server can easily identify the client by signing. Since each transmitted data item is related to the identity of the user, there is no need to request or provide the user ί S] 14 1322609 identity and password. The server can retrieve the stored information of the client and use the information to prepare the data (personalization, profile page) to be transmitted to the client. Examples of data used to represent personalization are the user's address (where the ordered item is sent), the user's shopping history, the user's shopping cart, the web page accessed by the last call, etc. . By checking the identity of the user (can be executed at any time in the process), the server can find that the user has not accessed the URL before. The server can then send a message containing a request specifying a user's preferences and detailed user profiles (contour pages). The user provides the information, and the client application sends it to the service and the ship n stores the data for setting it in the material. Since each data transmission is signed, the user identity of the client will be known to the player as soon as possible on the first page of the website. Personalization can occur earlier throughout the process. When the user chooses to turn off the signing server to recognize this fact and send - a page containing (not shown) indicating the opening or signing of a particular episode using the traditional user identity/password. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS [0009] The above-mentioned additional objects, features and advantageous factors will be apparent from the detailed description below. The novel features of the present invention will be set forth in the scope of the appended (four) patent application. When the invention is read in conjunction with the accompanying schema, the invention itself, and with a preferred mode of use, a more advanced goal and advantageous factors for it will be implemented by reference to the following The detailed description of the examples is fully understood, wherein: 15 called 2609, summer diagram A/B shows the prior art in the HTTP-client_word server environment, where the invention is suitably used; The figure shows the basic structure of a typical prior art in the HTTP-title; the third circle shows the creative structure of the Ηττρ header with the voucher and the digital signature; the 4A-4D shows the insertion of the voucher along with the digital signature into Ηττρ The preferred embodiment of the header t results in an inventive structure for the HTTP-request header; Figure 5 shows an example of a server-client communication environment using the present invention; Figure 6 shows a client-server interface In the environment, according to Figure A, the use of HTTP to identify the creative structure of the authentication data flow - the selected embodiment; and the 7A, 7B figure shows - based on the previous online shopping transaction program example of prior art recognition The present invention and comparative procedures inventive full authentication procedure. [Main component symbol description] 2 HTTP-client 4 HTTP-server 6 user database 9 authentication database 12 HTTP-request header 16 client certificate 20 signature component 24 encoding hardware 1 client machine 3 network server 5 Proxy Server 8 Application 1 〇 Smart Card Reader 14 Extended HTTP-Request Title 18 Digital Signature 22 Proxy Server 60 Requested Information 16
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