US11196733B2 - System and method for group of groups single sign-on demarcation based on first user login - Google Patents
System and method for group of groups single sign-on demarcation based on first user login Download PDFInfo
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- US11196733B2 US11196733B2 US15/891,815 US201815891815A US11196733B2 US 11196733 B2 US11196733 B2 US 11196733B2 US 201815891815 A US201815891815 A US 201815891815A US 11196733 B2 US11196733 B2 US 11196733B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0815—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities providing single-sign-on or federations
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/41—User authentication where a single sign-on provides access to a plurality of computers
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/104—Grouping of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
Definitions
- This disclosure relates generally to information handling systems and more particularly to systems and methods for single sign-on demarcation based on first user login.
- An information handling system generally processes, compiles, stores, and/or communicates information or data for business, personal, or other purposes thereby allowing users to take advantage of the value of the information.
- information handling systems may also vary regarding what information is handled, how the information is handled, how much information is processed, stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently the information may be processed, stored, or communicated.
- the variations in information handling systems allow for information handling systems to be general or configured for a specific user or specific use such as financial transaction processing, airline reservations, enterprise data storage, or global communications.
- information handling systems may include a variety of hardware and software components that may be configured to process, store, and communicate information and may include one or more computer systems, data storage systems, and networking systems.
- a management controller may be a device, system, or apparatus for remote monitoring or management of an information handling system.
- a management controller may be enabled to use a so-called ‘out-of-band’ network interface that is physically isolated from an ‘in-band’ network interface used generally for non-management communications.
- the management controller may include, or be an integral part of, a baseboard management controller (BMC), a Dell Remote Access Controller (DRAC), or an Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC).
- BMC baseboard management controller
- DRAC Dell Remote Access Controller
- iDRAC Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller
- the management controller may be a secondary information handling system embedded in the information handling system.
- a secondary information handling system which may be in the form of a management controller may communicate with other management controllers to form a local distributed computing node group.
- the local distributed computing node group may be formed by using exchanging public keys and Internet Protocol (IP) address information.
- IP Internet Protocol
- one or more management controllers may form another distributed computing node group, which may not be previously communicatively coupled to the management controllers in the local distributed computing node group.
- the management controllers in the other distributed computing node group may perform related functions to those in the local distributed computing node group, management controllers in the local distributed computing node group may not be able to communicate with the management controllers in the other distributed computing node group.
- a user may log in to a plurality of management controllers in the local distributed computing node group and across the distributed computing group hierarchy.
- Management controllers that are not in the local distributed computing node group may have privileges that are different than those in the local distributed computing node group.
- a user account and the associated privilege levels may vary from one management controller to another. For example, a user account at a management controller that may not be in the local distributed computing node group may have privileges that are different than those in a local distributed computing node group.
- the productivity of the user may be reduced by a need to enter the same user account credentials repeatedly to gain access to the management controllers.
- a disclosed method for access in a management controller group hierarchy includes receiving a request for a user at an information handling system, determining whether a link of trust is established, and validating the single sign-on request.
- the request may be to authenticate the user for access and may use a single sign-on token. Determining whether a link of trust is established may be based on an initial login location stored in the single sign-on token. Validating the single sign-on request may be based on a determination that the link of trust is established.
- the method may include determining whether the initial login location corresponds to an initial information handling system in the same local group of the management controller group hierarchy as the information handling system that received the request and granting the user full access based on a determination that the initial login location corresponds to an initial information handling system in the same local group of the management controller group hierarchy as the information handling system that received the request.
- the method may include determining whether the initial login location is recognized and based on a determination that the initial login location is not recognized, granting the user access to view information about an aggregate group in the management controller group hierarchy and denying the user access to the local group included in the aggregate group.
- the aggregate group may include at least one local group of information handling systems.
- the method may include receiving a request to elevate privileges of the user to enable access to a local group in the management controller group hierarchy, redirecting the request to a controlling member of the local group, and receiving a re-authenticated single sign-on token back from the controlling member of the local group.
- the information handling system may not be in the local group.
- the method may include determining whether the initial login location corresponds to an initial information handling system that manages an aggregate group in the management controller group hierarchy and granting the user full access based on a determination that the initial login location corresponds to the initial information handling system that manages the aggregate group in the management controller group hierarchy.
- the aggregate group may include the information handling system that received the request.
- the information handling system that received the request may be in a local group that is part of the aggregate group.
- Another disclosed aspect includes an information handling system, comprising a processor subsystem having access to a first memory, and a management controller comprising a secondary processor having access to a second memory, the second memory including an embedded storage partition and the second memory storing instructions executable by the secondary processor.
- a further disclosed aspect includes a management controller for an information handling system having a primary processor and a primary memory, the management controller comprising a secondary processor having access to a second memory, the second memory including an embedded storage partition and the second memory storing instructions executable by the secondary processor.
- An additional disclosed aspect includes an article of manufacture comprising a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions executable by a secondary processor, while an information handling system comprises a processor subsystem and the second processor.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of selected elements of an information handling system for single sign-on, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram of selected elements of a distributed computing node group for single sign-on, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram of selected elements of a distributed computing group hierarchy, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram of selected elements of a group of groups distributed computing group hierarchy, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 5A is a block diagram of selected elements of a single sign-on token, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 5B is a block diagram of selected elements of an encrypted payload, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 6 is a flow chart depicting selected elements of a method for configuring a group of groups distributed computing group hierarchy, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure
- FIG. 7 is a flow chart depicting selected elements of a method for group of groups single sign-on demarcation based on first user login, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 8 is a flow chart depicting selected elements of a method for elevated privileges of single sign-on in a group of groups, in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.
- an information handling system may include an instrumentality or aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate, switch, store, display, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, or utilize various forms of information, intelligence, or data for business, scientific, control, entertainment, or other purposes.
- an information handling system may be a personal computer, a PDA, a consumer electronic device, a network storage device, or another suitable device and may vary in size, shape, performance, functionality, and price.
- the information handling system may include memory, one or more processing resources such as a central processing unit (CPU) or hardware or software control logic.
- CPU central processing unit
- Additional components or the information handling system may include one or more storage devices, one or more communications ports for communicating with external devices as well as various input and output (I/O) devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, and a video display.
- the information handling system may also include one or more buses operable to transmit communication between the various hardware components.
- the information handling system may include firmware for controlling and/or communicating with, for example, hard drives, network circuitry, memory devices, I/O devices, and other peripheral devices.
- firmware includes software embedded in an information handling system component used to perform predefined tasks.
- Firmware is commonly stored in non-volatile memory, or memory that does not lose stored data upon the loss of power.
- firmware associated with an information handling system component is stored in non-volatile memory that is accessible to one or more information handling system components.
- firmware associated with an information handling system component is stored in non-volatile memory that is dedicated to and comprises part of that component.
- Computer-readable media may include an instrumentality or aggregation of instrumentalities that may retain data and/or instructions for a period of time.
- Computer-readable media may include, without limitation, storage media such as a direct access storage device (e.g., a hard disk drive or floppy disk), a sequential access storage device (e.g., a tape disk drive), compact disk, CD-ROM, DVD, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), and/or flash memory (SSD); as well as communications media such wires, optical fibers, microwaves, radio waves, and other electromagnetic and/or optical carriers; and/or any combination of the foregoing.
- storage media such as a direct access storage device (e.g., a hard disk drive or floppy disk), a sequential access storage device (e.g., a tape disk drive), compact disk, CD-ROM, DVD, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable
- FIGS. 1-3 wherein like numbers are used to indicate like and corresponding parts.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram depicting selected elements of an embodiment of information handling system 100 for single sign-on access. Also shown with information handling system 100 are external or remote elements, namely, network 155 and network storage resource 170 .
- components of information handling system 100 may include, but are not limited to, processor subsystem 120 , which may comprise one or more processors, and system bus 121 that communicatively couples various system components to processor subsystem 120 including, for example, memory 130 , I/O subsystem 140 , local storage resource 150 , and network interface 160 .
- System bus 121 may represent a variety of suitable types of bus structures, e.g., a memory bus, a peripheral bus, or a local bus using various bus architectures in selected embodiments.
- such architectures may include, but are not limited to, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, PCI-Express bus, HyperTransport (HT) bus, and Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus.
- MCA Micro Channel Architecture
- ISA Industry Standard Architecture
- EISA Enhanced ISA
- PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
- PCI-Express PCI-Express
- HT HyperTransport
- VESA Video Electronics Standards Association
- network interface 160 may be a suitable system, apparatus, or device operable to serve as an interface between information handling system 100 and a network 155 .
- Network interface 160 may enable information handling system 100 to communicate over network 155 using a suitable transmission protocol and/or standard, including, but not limited to, transmission protocols and/or standards enumerated below with respect to the discussion of network 155 .
- network interface 160 may be communicatively coupled via network 155 to network storage resource 170 .
- Network 155 may be implemented as, or may be a part of, a storage area network (SAN), personal area network (PAN), local area network (LAN), a metropolitan area network (MAN), a wide area network (WAN), a wireless local area network (WLAN), a virtual private network (VPN), an intranet, the Internet or another appropriate architecture or system that facilitates the communication of signals, data and/or messages (generally referred to as data).
- SAN storage area network
- PAN personal area network
- LAN local area network
- MAN metropolitan area network
- WAN wide area network
- WLAN wireless local area network
- VPN virtual private network
- intranet the Internet or another appropriate architecture or system that facilitates the communication of signals, data and/or messages (generally referred to as data).
- Network 155 may transmit data using a desired storage and/or communication protocol, including, but not limited to, Fibre Channel, Frame Relay, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), Internet protocol (IP), other packet-based protocol, small computer system interface (SCSI), Internet SCSI (iSCSI), Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) or another transport that operates with the SCSI protocol, advanced technology attachment (ATA), serial ATA (SATA), advanced technology attachment packet interface (ATAPI), serial storage architecture (SSA), integrated drive electronics (IDE), and/or any combination thereof.
- Network 155 and its various components may be implemented using hardware, software, or any combination thereof.
- information handling system 100 and network 155 may be included in a rack domain.
- processor subsystem 120 may comprise a system, device, or apparatus operable to interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data, and may include a microprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor (DSP), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or another digital or analog circuitry configured to interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data.
- processor subsystem 120 may interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data stored locally (e.g., in memory 130 and/or another component of physical hardware in processor subsystem 120 ).
- processor subsystem 120 may interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data stored remotely (e.g., in network storage resource 170 ).
- memory 130 may comprise a system, device, or apparatus operable to retain and/or retrieve program instructions and/or data for a period of time (e.g., computer-readable media).
- memory 130 stores operating system 132 , which may represent instructions executable by processor subsystem 120 to operate information handling system 100 after booting.
- operating system 132 may be stored at network storage resource 170 and may be accessed by processor subsystem 120 via network 155
- Memory 130 may comprise random access memory (RAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a PCMCIA card, flash memory, magnetic storage, opto-magnetic storage, and/or a suitable selection and/or array of volatile or non-volatile memory that retains data after power to its associated information handling system, such as information handling system 100 , is powered down.
- RAM random access memory
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
- PCMCIA card electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
- flash memory magnetic storage
- opto-magnetic storage and/or a suitable selection and/or array of volatile or non-volatile memory that retains data after power to its associated information handling system, such as information handling system 100 , is powered down.
- Local storage resource 150 may comprise computer-readable media (e.g., hard disk drive, floppy disk drive, CD-ROM, and/or other type of rotating storage media, flash memory, EEPROM, and/or another type of solid state storage media) and may be generally operable to store instructions and/or data.
- local storage resource 150 may store executable code in the form of program files that may be loaded into memory 130 for execution, such as operating system 132 .
- I/O subsystem 140 may comprise a system, device, or apparatus generally operable to receive and/or transmit data to/from/within information handling system 100 .
- I/O subsystem 140 may represent, for example, a variety of communication interfaces, graphics interfaces, video interfaces, user input interfaces, and/or peripheral interfaces.
- I/O subsystem 140 may include a Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCI-E) interface that is supported by processor subsystem 120 .
- PCI-E Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
- I/O subsystem 140 may comprise a touch panel and/or a display adapter.
- the touch panel (not shown) may include circuitry for enabling touch functionality in conjunction with a display (not shown) that is driven by display adapter (not shown).
- management controller (MC) 180 may include MC processor 182 as a second processor included with information handling system 100 for certain management tasks.
- MC 180 may interface with processor subsystem 120 using any suitable communication link 181 including, but not limited to, a direct interface with a platform controller hub, a system bus, and a network interface.
- the system bus may be system bus 121 , which may represent a variety of suitable types of bus structures, e.g., a memory bus, a peripheral bus, or a local bus using various bus architectures in selected embodiments.
- such architectures may include, but are not limited to, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, PCI-Express bus, HyperTransport (HT) bus, and Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus.
- MCA Micro Channel Architecture
- ISA Industry Standard Architecture
- EISA Enhanced ISA
- PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
- PCI-Express PCI-Express
- HT HyperTransport
- VESA Video Electronics Standards Association
- the network interface may be network interface 160 and/or network interface 190 .
- the platform controller hub may provide additional functionality for the processor subsystem 120 .
- the platform controller hub may be internal or external to a processor in processor subsystem 120 .
- the direct interface may be any suitable interface to enable communications, including but not limited to Direct Media Interface (DMI) or PCI-Express.
- DMI Direct Media Interface
- PCI-Express PCI-Ex
- MC processor 182 may have access to MC memory 184 , which may store MC firmware 186 , representing instructions executable by MC processor 182 . Also shown stored in MC memory 184 is MC storage partition 188 , which may represent an embedded storage partition for management controller 180 . MC firmware 186 may represent pre-boot instructions executable by MC processor 182 , for example, for preparing information handling system 100 to boot by activating various hardware components in preparation of launching operating system 132 for execution (also referred to as a basic input/output system (BIOS)). In certain embodiments, MC firmware 186 includes a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) according to a specification promulgated by the UEFI Forum (uefi.org).
- UEFI Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
- management controller 180 may be a secondary network interface to network interface 160 .
- MC network interface 190 may provide “out-of-band” network access to management controller 180 , for example, even when network interface 160 is unavailable.
- management controller 180 may execute MC firmware 186 on MC processor 182 and use MC network interface 190 even when other components in information handling system 100 are inoperable.
- management controller 180 may represent an instance of iDRAC while MC firmware 186 may include a lifecycle controller, which may assist in a variety of functions including, but not limited to, monitoring, updating, maintaining, testing, and deploying one or more components for an information handling system.
- Management controller 180 may communicate with other management controllers using MC network interface 190 .
- a set of management controllers in communication may form a group, in which each management controller may be a node.
- One of the management controllers in the group may operate as a group manager or a master.
- the master may facilitate and manage secure communication between the management controllers in the group.
- a set of groups in communication may form an aggregate group, in which each group may be a local group. Additional levels in the management controller hierarchy may be formed including, but not limited to, a bigger aggregate group including a set of aggregate groups.
- a distributed computing node group may be part of a distributed computing group hierarchy with two or more levels of groups.
- the distributed computing node group may be in the bottom level in the hierarchy and may be referred to as a local group.
- One or more local groups may be registered to form an aggregate group.
- the hierarchy may use a single sign-on token to enable a user to access multiple management controllers across the hierarchy without the need to repeatedly enter user access credentials.
- the single sign-on token may include an initial login location corresponding to the management controller where the user first logged in. The initial login location may be used to determine whether a subsequent request for authentication by the user corresponds to a traversal up or down the hierarchy.
- the initial login location may further be used to determine whether a subsequent request for authentication by the user corresponds to the same local group or same aggregate group.
- Trust links may be formed between local groups and their corresponding aggregate group. For example, a trust link may be formed between “Local Group 1” and “Local Group 2” via “Aggregate Group 1.” The trust link may enable members of “Local Group 1” to view aggregate information about “Local Group 2” or to gain full access to “Local Group 2” based on a request to elevate the privileges of the user.
- the user may gain full access to all local groups, such as “Local Group 1” and “Local Group 2,” down in the distributed computing group hierarchy from the aggregate group.
- a set of information handling systems 200 may be grouped together to form a distributed computing node group 202 .
- Group 202 may include a plurality of members 208 connected together with messaging channel 210 .
- group 202 is shown with seven members, group 202 may include any number of members suitable to form a distributed computing node group.
- Each member 208 may include a management controller 180 to manage group communications.
- Members 208 and/or management controllers 180 may use messaging channel 210 to send and receive messages to each other.
- the messages may be unencrypted, encrypted, signed, or unsigned.
- Messaging channel 210 may include any suitable interface between management controllers, including but not limited to a network interface, such as Ethernet, and an I/O interface, such as PCI-E.
- Group 202 may use secure messaging to improve the security of communications between members 208 .
- Group 202 may also include a member 208 that is a master, such as a primary master 204 and/or a secondary master 206 .
- the master may control and/or manage group 202 .
- Control of group 202 may include the addition and/or removal of members from group 202 , and/or authenticating members of group 202 when the member transitions to an online state from an offline state.
- the master may perform any operation sufficient to control or manage distributed computing node group 202 .
- the primary master may be selected at random.
- the primary master may be selected using the timestamp of entry into the group, in which the most recent member to join the group or the least recent member to join the group is elected the primary master.
- the secondary master 206 may serve as the master when the primary master is offline or unavailable. The election or selection of the secondary master 206 may be performed in a similar manner as the primary master.
- the distributed computing group hierarchy 300 may include a one or more routers 302 , which form part of a network.
- the network may be a public and/or private network.
- Router 302 - 2 may route data between different distributed groups and/or within a distributed group.
- the distributed group 300 may also include one or more switches 304 . Downstream of the routers, switches 304 - 1 and 304 - 2 may interface exclusively with other switches ( 304 - 3 , 304 - 4 , 304 - 5 , 304 - 6 and 304 - 7 ).
- the switches 304 and routers 302 may collectively operate to facilitate the transmission of messages between the nodes in the distributed group.
- the nodes may be grouped together to perform a particular type of function.
- group 306 - 1 may include two information handling systems 308 - 1 and 308 - 2 , which may be used for a SharePoint application.
- Group 306 - 2 may include three information handling systems 308 - 3 , 308 - 4 , and 308 - 5 , which may be used for file and print operations.
- Group 306 - 3 may include five information handling systems 308 - 6 , 308 - 7 , 308 - 8 , 308 - 9 , and 308 - 10 , which may be used for running various other applications.
- Each group may be uniquely identified through one or more attributes including, but not limited to, group name, universally unique identifier (UUID), or group passcode.
- group name e.g., group name
- UUID universally unique identifier
- group passcode e.g., group passcode
- groups 306 - 1 , 306 - 2 , and 306 - 3 may be subsystems within the same information handling system, such as a virtualized environment operating on the information handling system.
- Distributed computing group hierarchy 400 may include two or more levels of distributed computing node groups.
- larger aggregate group 1 ( 415 ) which may operate as an enterprise datacenter server, may include aggregate group 1 ( 410 - 1 ), aggregate group 2 ( 410 - 2 ), and aggregate group 3 ( 410 - 3 ).
- Aggregate group 1 ( 410 - 1 ) which may operate as an employee access server, may include local group Q ( 406 - 3 ), local group R ( 406 - 4 ), and local group S ( 406 - 5 ).
- Each local group may include many management controllers.
- local group Q ( 406 - 3 ) may include over one hundred management controllers.
- Aggregate group 2 ( 410 - 2 ), which may operate as a business data analytics server, may include local group 1 ( 406 - 1 ) and local group 2 ( 406 - 2 ).
- Aggregate group 3 ( 410 - 3 ) may operate as a web portal server and may include local group A ( 406 - 6 ).
- a user that logs in to a local group may have full access to management controllers in the group. For example, the user may be able to read and write information and configuration files to each management controller in the local group.
- the user may have read only access to other local groups ( 406 ) in distributed computing group hierarchy 400 .
- a user that logs in to local group 1 ( 406 - 1 ) may be able to read aggregate information about local group Q ( 406 - 3 ).
- Aggregate information may include, for example, the health status of local group Q ( 406 - 3 ). However, the aggregate information may not include information specific to a particular management controller or information handling system.
- the user may also have read only access to aggregate information of other aggregate groups ( 410 ) or larger aggregate groups ( 415 ).
- the user may gain full access to each management controller in each local group 406 below the aggregate group 410 in the distributed computing group hierarchy 400 .
- the user may gain full access, including the ability to read and write information and configuration files, to each management controller in local group Q ( 406 - 3 ), local group R ( 406 - 4 ), and local group S ( 406 - 5 ).
- distributed computing group hierarchy 400 may include two or more levels that are suitable for distributing computing.
- Management controllers in distributed computing group hierarchy 400 may enable the user to sign on to a local group ( 406 ) and use the same user account credentials without requiring the user to repeatedly enter the information.
- Management controllers modify a single sign-on token, such as a JSON web token, to include a login location tag, which may represent the server or group identifier corresponding to the location where the user first logged in.
- the single sign-on token containing the login location tag may be used to authenticate the user account credentials for access to other management controllers.
- the login location tag may contain the universally unique identifier (UUID) of the management controller or a suitable identifier for the local group, such as one or more portions of the Internet Protocol address for the local group.
- UUID universally unique identifier
- Other management controllers may receive the single sign-on token and evaluate the login location tag in the token to determine whether a trust link is established with the group associated with the initial log in location. If a trust link is established, management controllers in the same local group may provide for full access privileges and management controllers in the same aggregate group may provide for read only access privileges to aggregate information.
- Single sign-on token 500 may include encrypted header 505 , encrypted payload 510 , and signature 515 .
- Encrypted header 505 may provide information about the type of structure used by the single sign-on token and the type of algorithm used for signature 515 .
- the type of structure may be a JSON web token or a modified JSON web token with a login location tag and the type of algorithm may be SHA256.
- Encrypted payload 510 may provide information about the single sign-on, including the fields described for FIG. 5B .
- Signature 515 may be a signature of encrypted header 505 and encrypted payload 510 .
- the signature may be a JSON web signature using the SHA256 algorithm with an RSA key length of 4096 bits.
- Encrypted payload 510 may include a plurality of fields, including login location tag 525 , issuer group manager unit ID 530 , audience group manager unit ID 535 , expiration time of token 540 , issuance time of token 545 , and member ID 550 .
- Login location tag 525 may indicate the server or identify a group or universally unique identifier (UUID) of a master of a group corresponding to the management controller where the user first logged in.
- UUID universally unique identifier
- login location tag 525 may indicate the server using a server service tag.
- Issuer group manager unit ID 530 may indicate the UUID of the group manager, the UUID of the group manager of the aggregate group, the master of a local group, or a member of a local group that issues the single sign-on token.
- the issuer group manager unit ID 530 may correspond to a different management controller than login location tag 525 .
- the issuer group manager unit ID 530 may correspond to the same management controller as login location tag 525 .
- Audience group manager unit ID 535 may indicate the UUID of the management controller that is the group manager of the aggregate group, the master of a local group, or a member of the local group that is the intended audience for the single sign-on token. Specifying the UUID of the master of the local group, for example, may indicate that the local group is the audience for the single sign-on token.
- specifying the UUID of the management controller that is the group manager of the aggregate group may indicate that the aggregate group is the audience for the single sign-on token, which may provide the user with full access to the management controllers in the local groups that are part of the aggregate group.
- Expiration time of token 540 may indicate when the single sign-on token is set to expire. The expiration time may be defined in any suitable increment, such as 30 seconds. The time may be measured relative to the time at the issuer group manager as specified by issuance time of token 545 , which may be defined in the same increment as expiration time of token 540 . The user may need to prove user account credentials again after the single sign-on token expires.
- Member ID 550 may indicate the member UUID of the management controller that most recently used single sign-on token 500 . Although encrypted payload is shown with six fields, any number of fields suitable for single sign-on in a distributed computing group hierarchy may be used.
- Method 600 may be implemented by any of the elements shown in FIGS. 1-5 .
- Method 600 may be initiated by any suitable criteria and may initiate operation at any suitable point.
- method 600 may initiate operation at 605 .
- Method 600 may include greater or fewer steps than those illustrated.
- method 600 may execute its steps in an order that is different than those illustrated below.
- Method 600 may terminate at any suitable step.
- method 600 may repeat operation at any suitable step. Portions of method 600 may be performed in parallel and repeat with respect to other portions of method 600 .
- a management controller may receive a request to authenticate a user for access.
- the request may include user access credentials or a single-on token.
- the management controller may authenticate the user by verifying the user access credentials or the single sign-on token.
- the management controller may create a single sign-on token for the user with an initial login location corresponding to the management controller if the request included user access credentials.
- the initial login location may be any suitable identifier for the management controller, such as the UUID of the management controller or the Internet Protocol address of the management controller in the distributed computing group hierarchy.
- the management controller may be used to create a group of groups by registering the local group with an aggregate group. Registration may include adding a certificate for the local group for the aggregate group and adding a certificate for the aggregate group with the local group.
- the certification may include the Internet Protocol address of a group member, a group UUID, and a group shared public key.
- the certificates may be imported and exported using a group manager or by manual handling of certificates. Manual handling of the certificates may include the group manager displaying a base64 encoded certificate as a quick response (QR) code for a user to scan using a mobile information handling system.
- QR quick response
- the group manager of the local group may export the certificate of the local group
- the group manager of the aggregate group may import the certificate of the local group and export the certificate of the aggregate group
- the group manager of the local group may then import the certificate of the aggregate group.
- the group managers of the local group and aggregate group may display QR codes representing their certificates. In this case, the user may scan the QR codes using a mobile information handling system, and import the local group certificate into the aggregate group and the aggregate group certificate into the local group.
- the management controller may be used to register other local groups with the aggregate group. For example, “Local Group 2,” “Local Group 3,” and “Local Group 4” may join “Aggregate Group 1.”
- the management controller may be used to create a larger aggregate group. For example, “Larger Aggregate Group 1” may be created to include “Aggregate Group 1.”
- other aggregate groups may be registered with the larger aggregate group. For example, “Aggregate Group 2” and “Aggregate Group 3” may be registered with the “Larger Aggregate Group 1.”
- Method 700 may be implemented by any of the elements shown in FIGS. 1-6 .
- Method 700 may be initiated by any suitable criteria and may initiate operation at any suitable point.
- method 700 may initiate operation at 705 .
- Method 700 may include greater or fewer steps than those illustrated.
- method 700 may execute its steps in an order that is different than those illustrated below.
- Method 700 may terminate at any suitable step.
- method 700 may repeat operation at any suitable step. Portions of method 700 may be performed in parallel and repeat with respect to other portions of method 700 .
- a management controller may receive a request to authenticate the user for access to a target management controller.
- it may be determined whether the request corresponds to traversing up the distributed computing group hierarchy. If the request corresponds to traversing upward, method 700 may proceed to 715 . Otherwise, method 700 may proceed to 720 .
- it may be determined whether a trust link is established to the aggregate group.
- a trust link may be established between groups at any two levels in the distributed computing group hierarchy. For example, a trust link may be established between a local group and an aggregate group. As another example, a trust link may be established between an aggregate group and a larger aggregate group. The aggregate group may be the group in which the target management controller resides.
- method 700 may proceed to 740 . Otherwise, method 700 may proceed to 755 .
- a trust link is established from the aggregate group.
- the target management controller may be a member of the aggregate group. If a trust link is established, method 700 may proceed to 730 . Otherwise, method 700 may proceed to 755 .
- read only access may be allowed for the user. The user may be able to read aggregate information about the target management controller based on the initial login location of the user and the location of the target management controller.
- the initial login location is in the same local group as the target management controller.
- the initial login location in the single sign-on token may be used to determine the local group for which the user has access. If the local groups are the same, method 700 may proceed to 750 . Otherwise, method 700 may proceed to 755 .
- full access to the local group of the target management controller may be allowed using the single sign-on token. For example, the information and configuration files of each management controller in the local group may be read, written, and/or modified.
- user access may be denied.
- Method 800 may be implemented by any of the elements shown in FIGS. 1-7 .
- Method 800 may be initiated by any suitable criteria and may initiate operation at any suitable point.
- method 800 may initiate operation at 805 .
- Method 800 may include greater or fewer steps than those illustrated.
- method 800 may execute its steps in an order that is different than those illustrated below.
- Method 800 may terminate at any suitable step.
- method 800 may repeat operation at any suitable step. Portions of method 800 may be performed in parallel and repeat with respect to other portions of method 800 .
- a management controller may receive a request from a user to elevate the privileges of the user for the user to gain access to another local group.
- the management controller may operate as the group manager for the local group.
- the user may have previously provided user account credentials to log in to the local group.
- a single sign-on token with the initial login location may have been created when the user first logged in using user account credentials.
- the management controller may determine which other local group the request is directed to by using any suitable identifier for the other local group, such as the UUID or Internet Protocol address of the group manager or master for the other local group. If the other local group is already registered with the aggregate group, the group manager of the aggregate group may hold a certificate corresponding to the other local group.
- the certificate may include one or more identifiers corresponding to the other local group including, but not limited to, the Internet Protocol address of a group member, a group UUID, and a group shared public key. If the other local group is registered with the aggregate group, method 800 may proceed to 815 .
- method 800 may proceed to 825 .
- the management controller that received the request may redirect the request to a controlling member.
- the controlling member may be the controlling member of the other local group or the controlling member of the aggregate group that includes the local group at which the request was received and the other local group.
- the controlling member of the aggregate group such as the group manager or master of the aggregate group or larger aggregate group, may have all the required information to authenticate the user using a single sign-on token.
- the management controller that received the request may include a single sign-on token for the user in the redirection. For example, the management controller may redirect the request to the group manager or master of the other local group.
- the redirection may result in the user being prompted by a member of the other local group for user account credentials to elevate the access privileges for the user.
- the user may be shown a new webpage or window in which the user may enter user account credentials for authentication, such as biometric authentication, smartcard authentication, and/or authentication using a username and password. Other suitable forms of authentication that may verify the identity and credentials of the user may be used.
- the controlling member may update the single sign-on token after the user is authenticated.
- the single sign-on token may be updated with the initial login location such that the user has full access to at least two local groups.
- the controlling member may create a new single sign-on token or a portion of a new single sign-on token, such as the initial login location, and send the information back to the management controller that redirected the request.
- the management controller that received the request may wait for the controlling member of the other local group to authenticate the user using the single sign-on token.
- the management controller may receive a single sign-on token from the controlling member of the other local group.
- the management controller may register the other local group with the aggregate group corresponding to the initial login location. Registration may be performed by group managers and/or a user, as described in more detail for 620 and 625 of FIG. 6 above. For example, if the initial login location was a management controller in “Local Group 1,” which is part of “Aggregate Group 1,” the other local group (“Local Group 2”) may be registered with “Aggregate Group 1.”
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