US20020146119A1 - Two channel secure communication - Google Patents

Two channel secure communication Download PDF

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Publication number
US20020146119A1
US20020146119A1 US09/775,942 US77594201A US2002146119A1 US 20020146119 A1 US20020146119 A1 US 20020146119A1 US 77594201 A US77594201 A US 77594201A US 2002146119 A1 US2002146119 A1 US 2002146119A1
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time pad
communication
server
messages
communicating parties
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Alexander Liss
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/606Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/12Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry

Definitions

  • the invention relies on well known methods of protection of communication with the use of cryptography (see for example, A. Menezes, P. Oorschot, Scott Vanstone Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997).
  • a sender uses a special algorithm, which meshes-up bits of the message.
  • This algorithm uses a relatively short secret key as a parameter.
  • a recipient has a reverse algorithm, which allows a restoration of the messages, when the key is known.
  • An example is well known DES. This is a relatively slow encryption, but parties have to secretly share only a relatively small key.
  • a combination of both methods could be a method, where both parties need to share only a relatively short secret key and do not need to share secretly a one-time pad before the communication.
  • a sender creates the one-time pad as needed, encrypts it using this secret key, encrypts its message using this one-time pad and passes to a receiver a combination of this encrypted one-time pad and an encrypted message.
  • this method is slow (it needs a generation of the one-time pad and the key-based encryption) and an encrypted message is at least two times longer than an original one; hence, it is not used.
  • the invention is a method of encrypted communication, where instead of one communication channel there are two channels; one channel is used to pass an encrypted one-time pad and the other channel is used to pass messages, encrypted with the help of this one-time pad; the one-time pad and messages are created and passed independently (with some coordination) and concurrently.
  • a communication channel could be used for relatively short periods. Similar situation could be with a processor(s) load, for example because an application is waiting for a reply from a remote server, etc.
  • One-time Pad Module uses its own communication channel(s) and works concurrently with the rest of an application. The rest of the application uses this one-time pad to encrypt and decrypt messages, which it exchanges with other parties.
  • Communication channel(s) of the One-time Pad Module and communication channel(s) of the rest of the application can be created through a usual multiplexing of an existing channel with the help of message headers.
  • cooperating One-time Pad Modules create two parts of a one-time pad, one for sending (sending one-time pad) and another for receiving (receiving one-time pad).
  • the application of a communicating party supplies to its One-time Pad Module an estimate of size of one-time pad, which it needs for an entire session. It corrects this estimate as the session progresses.
  • Each time it sends a message it requests from the One-time Pad Module a sending one-time pad of a length needed to encrypt a message.
  • Each time it receives a message it requests from the One-time Pad Module a receiving one-time pad of a length needed to decrypt a message.
  • two weak computing devices which communicate between each other, can use the help of a powerful server to secure their communication. They communicate between themselves, and, in addition, they communicate with this server.
  • This server creates and passes to them all needed parts of a one-time pad in an encrypted form. They decrypt these parts of one-time pad concurrently with their other operations and store them to secure their exchange of messages.
  • one of communication parties is a weak computing device and the other is a server with sufficient resources
  • the server can create all needed parts of one-time pad and pass them to the device in an encrypted form.
  • the device decrypts them and stores to secure its exchange of messages.
  • the device uses only key-based decryption and does not use key-based encryption. This opens a possibility to improve a speed of communication with asymmetric encryption algorithms, where decryption is fast at expense of slow encryption.
  • a party creates a part of one-time pad, which it uses to decrypt messages, which it receives.
  • One-time Pad Modules have to coordinate between themselves a size of this part of one-time pad, because it is based on requests of an application, running at other party.
  • a distributed application consists of a server, which runs on a multiprocessor computer, and clients, which run on PCs. Clients securely communicate with this server.
  • a server computer has a cryptographic hardware, which speeds up cryptographic computations and provides a random bits generation.
  • One-time Pad Modules are implemented as software objects. They can be created, when they are needed, and they use their own threads of execution, independent from the rest of application.
  • SSL Secure Socket Layer
  • a client When a client connects to the server, it creates two sockets and an instance of software object—a One-time Pad Module. It uses the first socket to exchange messages with the server, securing them with a one-time pad. The second socket is used by the One-time Pad Module.
  • the server When the server connects to a client, it creates two sockets and an instance of software object dedicated to this client—a One-time Pad Module. It uses the first socket to exchange messages with the client, securing them with a one-time pad. The second socket is used by the One-time Pad Module.
  • the client and the server pass to their respective One-time Pad Modules an estimate of the size of a one-time pad, which they need to send their messages.
  • the server's One-time Pad Module starts creating a part of one-time pad needed to sent its messages, in a separate execution thread, as soon it receives the estimate of its size.
  • the One-time Pad Module of the client and the dedicated to this client One-time Pad Module of the server establish a secure session through an SSL Handshake protocol.
  • the client's One-time Pad Module passes to the server's One-time Pad Module the estimate of the size of the part of one-time pad, which it needs to send client's messages.
  • the server's One-time Pad Module starts creation of the part of one-time pad, which the client needs to send its messages, in a separate execution thread, as soon as it receives its size.
  • the server finds, that it needs a longer part of one-time pad to send its messages to the client, it informs the dedicated to this client One-time Pad Module.
  • the One-time Pad Module generates new pieces of this part of one-time pad and passes them to the client's One-time Pad Module.
  • the client finds, that it needs a longer part of one-time pad to send its messages to the server, it informs its One-time Pad Module and it informs the dedicated to this client server's One-time Pad Module.
  • the server's One-time Pad Module generates new pieces of this part of one-time pad and passes them to the client's One-time Pad Module.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Abstract

The invention is a method of encrypted communication, where instead of one communication channel between two communicating parties there are two channels; one channel is used to pass an one-time pad encrypted with the use of a private key, known to both parties, and the other channel is used to pass messages, encrypted with the help of this one-time pad; the one-time pad and messages are created and exchanged concurrently.

Description

    BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • The invention relies on well known methods of protection of communication with the use of cryptography (see for example, A. Menezes, P. Oorschot, Scott Vanstone Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997). [0001]
  • Among strong methods of encryption is a method based on one-time pad. In this method, there is a sequence or a few sequences of random bits known before a communication session to both communicating parties. Usually, there are two sequences—one to encrypt messages sent in one direction and the other to encrypt messages sent in the other direction. A sender takes a sequence of bits representing a message and combines them with bits of this one-time pad using logical XOR operation. After that, the sender destroys used bits of the one-time pad. A recipient uses the same bits of one-time pad to restore this message with the same logical XOR operation. After that, the recipient destroys used bits of the one-time pad. It is very fast encryption, but both parties have to secretly share a one-time pad, which is long. [0002]
  • In another approach, a sender uses a special algorithm, which meshes-up bits of the message. This algorithm uses a relatively short secret key as a parameter. A recipient has a reverse algorithm, which allows a restoration of the messages, when the key is known. An example is well known DES. This is a relatively slow encryption, but parties have to secretly share only a relatively small key. [0003]
  • It should not be possible to discern any pattern in one-time pad or in a key. Otherwise, there is a possibility of an attack on the encryption. The generation of such cryptographically secure random series of bits is computationally consuming or it requires the use of a special hardware. [0004]
  • A combination of both methods could be a method, where both parties need to share only a relatively short secret key and do not need to share secretly a one-time pad before the communication. A sender creates the one-time pad as needed, encrypts it using this secret key, encrypts its message using this one-time pad and passes to a receiver a combination of this encrypted one-time pad and an encrypted message. Unfortunately, this method is slow (it needs a generation of the one-time pad and the key-based encryption) and an encrypted message is at least two times longer than an original one; hence, it is not used. [0005]
  • Different variants of securing communication (encrypting) using one-time pad are described in following U.S. Pat. Nos.: [0006]
    6,104,811 Aiello, et al. Aug. 15, 2000
    6,078,665 Anderson, et al. June 20, 2000
    6,021,203 Douceur, et al. Feb. 1, 2000
    5,751,808 Anshel, et al. May 12, 1998
    5,717,760 Satterfield Feb. 10, 1998
    5,703,948 Yanovsky Dec. 30, 1997
    5,539,827 Liu July 23, 1996
    5,515,307 Aiello, et al. May 7, 1996
    5,483,598 Kaufman, et al. Jan. 9, 1996
    6,128,386 Satterfield Oct. 3, 2000
    6,088,456 McCracken, et al. July 11, 2000
    6,076,097 London, et al. June 13, 2000
    5,479,513 Protopopescu, et al. Dec. 26, 1995
    5,440,640 Anshel, et al. Aug. 8, 1995
    5,335,280 Vobach Aug. 2, 1994
    5,297,207 Degele Mar. 22, 1994
  • BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • The invention is a method of encrypted communication, where instead of one communication channel there are two channels; one channel is used to pass an encrypted one-time pad and the other channel is used to pass messages, encrypted with the help of this one-time pad; the one-time pad and messages are created and passed independently (with some coordination) and concurrently.[0007]
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
  • An encrypted communication should be viewed in a context of an application, where it is used. [0008]
  • In some applications especially in transaction based applications, a communication channel could be used for relatively short periods. Similar situation could be with a processor(s) load, for example because an application is waiting for a reply from a remote server, etc. [0009]
  • In other applications, there could be a clear asymmetry between communicating parties. For example one is a client, which runs in a device with low computational power, and the other is a server, which runs on a powerful computer with special hardware supporting cryptographic computations and the random number generation. [0010]
  • To utilize these communication and processing resources we separate a process of one-time pad creation and its exchange with other parties into a separate module—One-time Pad Module. One-time Pad Module uses its own communication channel(s) and works concurrently with the rest of an application. The rest of the application uses this one-time pad to encrypt and decrypt messages, which it exchanges with other parties. [0011]
  • One-time Pad Modules of communicating parties communicate between themselves independently. [0012]
  • Communication channel(s) of the One-time Pad Module and communication channel(s) of the rest of the application can be created through a usual multiplexing of an existing channel with the help of message headers. [0013]
  • At each communicating party, cooperating One-time Pad Modules create two parts of a one-time pad, one for sending (sending one-time pad) and another for receiving (receiving one-time pad). The application of a communicating party supplies to its One-time Pad Module an estimate of size of one-time pad, which it needs for an entire session. It corrects this estimate as the session progresses. Each time it sends a message, it requests from the One-time Pad Module a sending one-time pad of a length needed to encrypt a message. Each time it receives a message, it requests from the One-time Pad Module a receiving one-time pad of a length needed to decrypt a message. [0014]
  • In a general case, there could be a few communicating parties, which One-time Pad Modules cooperate in a creation of a one-time pad. [0015]
  • For example, two weak computing devices, which communicate between each other, can use the help of a powerful server to secure their communication. They communicate between themselves, and, in addition, they communicate with this server. This server creates and passes to them all needed parts of a one-time pad in an encrypted form. They decrypt these parts of one-time pad concurrently with their other operations and store them to secure their exchange of messages. [0016]
  • If one of communication parties is a weak computing device and the other is a server with sufficient resources, then the server can create all needed parts of one-time pad and pass them to the device in an encrypted form. The device decrypts them and stores to secure its exchange of messages. [0017]
  • In both cases, the device uses only key-based decryption and does not use key-based encryption. This opens a possibility to improve a speed of communication with asymmetric encryption algorithms, where decryption is fast at expense of slow encryption. [0018]
  • When communicating parties have comparable resources and load, they can share work of creation of a one-time pad. One party creates one part of it, the other party creates the other part of it and they exchange these parts in an encrypted form. For example, each party creates a one-time pad, which it uses to encrypt messages, which it sends. [0019]
  • In another setting, a party creates a part of one-time pad, which it uses to decrypt messages, which it receives. In this setting, One-time Pad Modules have to coordinate between themselves a size of this part of one-time pad, because it is based on requests of an application, running at other party. [0020]
  • It could be a case, when an application needs to wait for a One-time Pad Module to complete its work with cryptographic procedures or communication. It happens, when the application requests a one-time pad of some length for a message (to encrypt or to decrypt it) and the needed part of one-time pad of this length is not ready yet. The shorter is a delay, caused by these cases, the more efficient is an offered here approach to securing of communication. [0021]
  • Following is a description of an implementation of this method. [0022]
  • A distributed application consists of a server, which runs on a multiprocessor computer, and clients, which run on PCs. Clients securely communicate with this server. [0023]
  • A server computer has a cryptographic hardware, which speeds up cryptographic computations and provides a random bits generation. [0024]
  • One-time Pad Modules are implemented as software objects. They can be created, when they are needed, and they use their own threads of execution, independent from the rest of application. [0025]
  • One-time Pad Modules use Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, which is common on the Internet. [0026]
  • When a client connects to the server, it creates two sockets and an instance of software object—a One-time Pad Module. It uses the first socket to exchange messages with the server, securing them with a one-time pad. The second socket is used by the One-time Pad Module. [0027]
  • When the server connects to a client, it creates two sockets and an instance of software object dedicated to this client—a One-time Pad Module. It uses the first socket to exchange messages with the client, securing them with a one-time pad. The second socket is used by the One-time Pad Module. [0028]
  • The client and the server pass to their respective One-time Pad Modules an estimate of the size of a one-time pad, which they need to send their messages. [0029]
  • The server's One-time Pad Module starts creating a part of one-time pad needed to sent its messages, in a separate execution thread, as soon it receives the estimate of its size. [0030]
  • In the beginning of the client-server communication, the One-time Pad Module of the client and the dedicated to this client One-time Pad Module of the server establish a secure session through an SSL Handshake protocol. [0031]
  • The client's One-time Pad Module passes to the server's One-time Pad Module the estimate of the size of the part of one-time pad, which it needs to send client's messages. [0032]
  • The server's One-time Pad Module starts creation of the part of one-time pad, which the client needs to send its messages, in a separate execution thread, as soon as it receives its size. [0033]
  • Both parts of one-time pad created by the server's One-time Pad Module are passed securely to the client using SSL Record Layer protocol. They are passed in pieces, as pieces are generated. [0034]
  • When the server finds, that it needs a longer part of one-time pad to send its messages to the client, it informs the dedicated to this client One-time Pad Module. The One-time Pad Module generates new pieces of this part of one-time pad and passes them to the client's One-time Pad Module. [0035]
  • When the client finds, that it needs a longer part of one-time pad to send its messages to the server, it informs its One-time Pad Module and it informs the dedicated to this client server's One-time Pad Module. The server's One-time Pad Module generates new pieces of this part of one-time pad and passes them to the client's One-time Pad Module. [0036]
  • When client-server communication ends, both One-time Pad Modules are destroyed. [0037]

Claims (6)

I claim:
1. A method of securing communication, where
messages are passed between communicating parties encrypted with a one-time pad, for example by combining bits of a message and bits of the one-time pad using a logical XOR operation, through one channel or a group of channels,
the one-time pad is exchanged between communicating parties through another channel or a group of channels in an encrypted form with the use of private key encryption, for example DES.
2. The method of securing communication of the claim 1, where the one-time pad is generated and passed between communicating parties concurrently with the rest of an application, which uses this secure communication.
3. The method of securing communication of the claim 1, where the one-time pad is entirely generated by one communicating party and used by other communicating parties, and possibly by this one also.
4. The method of securing communication of the claim 1, where the one-time pad consists of two or more parts, each part is generated by a different communicating party and parts are exchanged between communicating parties in an encrypted form.
5. The method of securing communication of the claim 1, where a part of one-time pad is broken into a sequence of pieces and passed between communicating parties in pieces.
6. The method of securing communication of the claim 5, where the additional pieces of one-time pad are generated and passed between communicating parties as needed.
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Cited By (16)

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US20030149869A1 (en) * 2002-02-01 2003-08-07 Paul Gleichauf Method and system for securely storing and trasmitting data by applying a one-time pad
US20050125684A1 (en) * 2002-03-18 2005-06-09 Schmidt Colin M. Session key distribution methods using a hierarchy of key servers
US20070016794A1 (en) * 2005-06-16 2007-01-18 Harrison Keith A Method and device using one-time pad data
US20070074277A1 (en) * 2005-09-29 2007-03-29 Christopher Tofts Method of provisioning devices with one-time pad data, device for use in such method, and service usage tracking based on one-time pad data
US7310730B1 (en) 2003-05-27 2007-12-18 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for communicating an encrypted broadcast to virtual private network receivers
US20080031456A1 (en) * 2005-09-29 2008-02-07 Keith Alexander Harrison Device with multiple one-time pads and method of managing such a device
US20080112563A1 (en) * 2006-11-15 2008-05-15 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Apparatus and method for dynamic ciphering in a mobile communication system
US20100172499A1 (en) * 2009-01-08 2010-07-08 Sony Corporation Apparatus, method, program, and system for information processing
US8160243B1 (en) * 2009-10-01 2012-04-17 Rockwell Collins, Inc. System, apparatus, and method for the secure storing of bulk data using one-time pad encryption
US20150229614A1 (en) * 2013-08-09 2015-08-13 Introspective Power, Inc. Data encryption cipher using rotating ports
US9584313B2 (en) 2013-08-09 2017-02-28 Introspective Power, Inc. Streaming one time pad cipher using rotating ports for data encryption
CN106788989A (en) * 2016-11-30 2017-05-31 华为技术有限公司 A kind of method and apparatus for setting up safe encryption channel
EP3439227A1 (en) * 2017-08-01 2019-02-06 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Secure communications on multiple channels without key exchange
CN111355656A (en) * 2014-01-27 2020-06-30 法斯埃托股份有限公司 System and method for peer-to-peer communication
US10983565B2 (en) 2014-10-06 2021-04-20 Fasetto, Inc. Portable storage device with modular power and housing system
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Cited By (32)

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US20030149869A1 (en) * 2002-02-01 2003-08-07 Paul Gleichauf Method and system for securely storing and trasmitting data by applying a one-time pad
US20050125684A1 (en) * 2002-03-18 2005-06-09 Schmidt Colin M. Session key distribution methods using a hierarchy of key servers
US7477748B2 (en) 2002-03-18 2009-01-13 Colin Martin Schmidt Session key distribution methods using a hierarchy of key servers
US7310730B1 (en) 2003-05-27 2007-12-18 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for communicating an encrypted broadcast to virtual private network receivers
US20070016794A1 (en) * 2005-06-16 2007-01-18 Harrison Keith A Method and device using one-time pad data
US9191198B2 (en) * 2005-06-16 2015-11-17 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Method and device using one-time pad data
US8250363B2 (en) * 2005-09-29 2012-08-21 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Method of provisioning devices with one-time pad data, device for use in such method, and service usage tracking based on one-time pad data
US20070074277A1 (en) * 2005-09-29 2007-03-29 Christopher Tofts Method of provisioning devices with one-time pad data, device for use in such method, and service usage tracking based on one-time pad data
US20080031456A1 (en) * 2005-09-29 2008-02-07 Keith Alexander Harrison Device with multiple one-time pads and method of managing such a device
US8842839B2 (en) 2005-09-29 2014-09-23 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Device with multiple one-time pads and method of managing such a device
US20080112563A1 (en) * 2006-11-15 2008-05-15 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Apparatus and method for dynamic ciphering in a mobile communication system
US20100172499A1 (en) * 2009-01-08 2010-07-08 Sony Corporation Apparatus, method, program, and system for information processing
EP2209077A3 (en) * 2009-01-08 2012-01-25 Sony Corporation Apparatus, method, program, and system for information processing
US8489879B2 (en) 2009-01-08 2013-07-16 Sony Corporation Apparatus, method, program, and system for information processing
EP2209077A2 (en) 2009-01-08 2010-07-21 Sony Corporation Apparatus, method, program, and system for information processing
CN101778383A (en) * 2009-01-08 2010-07-14 索尼公司 Apparatus, method, program, and system for information processing
US8160243B1 (en) * 2009-10-01 2012-04-17 Rockwell Collins, Inc. System, apparatus, and method for the secure storing of bulk data using one-time pad encryption
US20150229614A1 (en) * 2013-08-09 2015-08-13 Introspective Power, Inc. Data encryption cipher using rotating ports
US9584488B2 (en) * 2013-08-09 2017-02-28 Introspective Power, Inc. Data encryption cipher using rotating ports
US20170134345A1 (en) * 2013-08-09 2017-05-11 Introspective Power, Inc. Data encryption cipher using rotating ports
US9584313B2 (en) 2013-08-09 2017-02-28 Introspective Power, Inc. Streaming one time pad cipher using rotating ports for data encryption
US9825922B2 (en) * 2013-08-09 2017-11-21 Introspective Power, Inc. Data encryption cipher using rotating ports
US10057052B2 (en) 2013-08-09 2018-08-21 Introspective Power, Inc. Data encryption cipher using rotating ports
US10348688B2 (en) * 2013-08-09 2019-07-09 Introspective Power, Inc. Streaming one time pad virtual private network
US11374854B2 (en) 2014-01-27 2022-06-28 Fasetto, Inc. Systems and methods for peer-to-peer communication
US12107757B2 (en) 2014-01-27 2024-10-01 Fasetto, Inc. Systems and methods for peer-to-peer communication
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